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I. Introduction
As one of the three international institutions 1formed in the aftermath of the Second
World War constituting the postwar world economic order, the GATT was an
international treaty with its central mission promoting free trade among the contracting
parties. During the forty-seven years of its existence (1947-1994), the GATT provided a
legal framework within which most international trade was conducted. On January 1,
1995, the WTO was established in accordance with the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations under the auspices of the GATT. The replacement of the GATT
by an institutional body, the WTO, ushered in a new era in the international trade system.
Based on Geneva, Switzerland, the WTO is an inter-governmental organization.
Its main decision-making bodies are councils and committees consisting of the WTO's
entire membership. Administrative and technical support comes from the WTO
Secretariat in Geneva. The organization has 132 members, 34 observer governments and
7 international organization observers to General Council (as of September 1997).
People's Republic of China is a newly leading power in an ever more
interdependent global economy. In two decades, the value of China's merchandise
exports has expanded more than twenty-fold, reaching US$182.7 billion in 1997, ranking
1 The IMF, founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, was designed to deal with the cooperation
and regulation of the monetary aspects of international economic exchange. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), also founded at the Bretton Woods Conference, was
originally devised to provide funds for the rebuilding of Western Europe and has since evolved into the
primary world economic organization under the auspices of the Under the auspices of the United Nations.
For the development of the GATT and its role in the postwar world, see Gilbert Winham, The evolution
of International Trade Agreements (1992).
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and US$142.4 billion in import in 1997, ranking 12 in , if including Hong Kong, then
China would be the top five exporters and importers in world merchandise trade. And
china is also the second largest recipient of foreign investment around the world. Today
the Chinese economy represents between 5 to 1 percent of global output, depending on
the method used to calculate national production.
But up to now, China is still not a member country of the WTO. In this thesis, I
like to analyze China's bid to the WTO, and make it clear why it's the history task which
needs joint efforts. Part II will reiterate the importance of China's accession to WTO. Part
III will review the major events in China's bid to the GATT and the WTO since the
establishment of the GATT. Part IV will analyze the major obstacles to China's
admission to the WTO. Part V and Part VI will state what China should do and what the
WTO should do separately.
3
See World Trade Organization
,
International Trade Trends and Statistics (1997) Only United States,
Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, Hong Kong rank ahead of China in
exporting,: And United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Canada,
Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, South Korea ranked ahead of China in importing.
II. Importance of China's membership in the WTO
Despite China's non-complicance with the WTO standards, it is important for both
economic and strategic reasons that China ultimately be admitted and become integrated
into the world economy. China's admission to the WTO will make the WTO a more
effective international economic institution, increase economic activity and the peaceful
resolution of trade disputes, and help bring China more firmly into the family of nations,
which may in turn help to resolve other world problems.
A. Making the WTO a more effective international economic institution
China's admission will make the WTO a more effective international economic
institution. China is an important economic figure in the world, the WTO is incomplete
without it as a member.4 China is one of the largest exporter and importer in the world,
and the second largest recipient of foreign investment. Renato Ruggiero, Director
General of the WTO, has said that "the global multilateral trading system would be
incomplete should China continue to be kept out of WTO China, with its rapid
economic growth and particularly its great potential, would become one of the major
forces supporting [the] world's new trading order." 5
4
See Kwan Weng Kin, China in WTO Will Play by Rules, STRAITS TIMES ( Singapore), Nov. 20, 1996, at
16, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Cumws File (claiming that the United States is the country most
capable of integrating China into the world economy). Dr. Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University, argues that casting China as the enemy would create a "self-
fulfilling prophecy."
5
Ruggiero: Global Trading System Incomplete Without China, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 20, 1995,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File.
B. Increasing economic activity in the world
Besides making the WTO a more effective economic institution, China's admission
to the WTO will increase economic activity in the world. If China further opened its
economy, it would be a huge export market for the rest of the world. 6 The European
Commissioner for External Economic Affairs and Commercial Policy, Leon Brittan, has
said that "China's membership [is] essential for the world economy." 7
It is estimated that China's modernization will require imports of equipment and
technology of about US$100 billion annually, and infrastructure expenditures during the
latter half of this decade could amount to about US$250 billion. This is not to mention
rising demand for energy, mineral resources, food and farming imports, which, despite
the size and resources of the Chinese economy, cannot be satisfied by domestic output
alone.
The basic fact is that China is moving to the very center of the globalization
process, and both China and other nations are benefiting from it. We live in a world
where technology, capital, and trade move increasingly more freely; where the old
economic tools have lost their edge; and where economic strength and security
increasingly depend on economic openness and integration. China's path to growth and
modernization is also a path to interdependence.
This process of globalization will not be reversed—it will accelerate. Throughout
the world, economic and technological forces are breaking down walls, reaching across
borders, and weaving together a single world economy. In the late twentieth century our
6
See Ruth Youngblood, China Issues Warning Over WTO Admission. UPI, May 13, 1995, available in
Lexis-Nexis Library, UPI File. Vice Premier Lanqing Li of China has said that China's admission to the
WTO will lead to "[a] more open China [that] will provide the world economy with a huge market, more
employment and better chances for international allocation of resources."
5new opportunities, a well as our challenges—in trade, in economics, in every facet of
international politics—arise from our worlds moving closer together, not further apart.
Deepening interdependence is the central reality for China and for the world.
C. Making the WTO a better mechanism to resolve international trade disputes
If China is admitted to the WTO, the WTO will become a better mechanism to
resolve international trade disputes. A multilateral forum can better address trade disputes
with China than the present ad-hoc bilateral negotiations that currently dominate the US-
China trade regime. 8
For China, a key step towards completing its interdependence is bringing China into
the multilateral trading system. China's economic relations with the world are simply too
large and too pervasive to manage effectively through a maze of arbitrary, shifting and
unstable bilateral deals. China's best guarantee of coherent and consistent international
trade policies is to be found inside the rules-based multilateral system.
By the same token, China, like all other countries, can best manage its growing
economic relations with the world on the basis of rights and obligations agreed by
consensus and reflected in enforceable rules and disciplines. This is the only way to resist
bilateral pressures or threats of unilateral actions. It is also the only way to sustain and
promote domestic economic reform knowing that China's efforts in this direction are
being matched by its trading partners, members of the WTO, who share the same
obligations under the WTO Agreements.
7
Beijing Resumes Talks on Joining World Trade Organization. AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, May 9, 1995,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File.
8
See Prepared Testimony of Michael A. Samuels, President of Samuels International Associates, Inc. On
behalf of the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means
Subcomm. on Trade, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 19, 1996, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Fednew File.
Samules served as Deputy United States Trade Representative and United States Ambassador to the GATT.
6D. Helping China to fulfill its huge potential for development and bringing China
into the family of nations, which may in turn help to resolve world problems.
As China's economy expands into the future, so too will its ties to the global
economy. Dependence on export markets will continue to grow rapidly, and not only for
Labor Intensive products like footwear and toys, but for the higher technology goods and
services that are an increasing proportion of China's output as it climbs up the production
ladder. Imports will also rise, in part to fuel further industrialization and modernization,
but also in response to consumer demand. And an ever expanding web of inward and
outward investment will draw China deeper into the global financial system.
Joining the WTO means assuming binding obligations in respect of import
polices—obligations which will necessitate an adjustment in China's trade polices and, in
most cases, economic restructuring. But, in turn, China will benefit from the extension to
it of all the advantages that have been negotiated among the more than 130 members of
the WTO. China will be entitled to export its products and services to the markets of
other WTO members at the rates of duty and levels of commitment negotiated in the
Uruguay Round—this includes tariff bindings benefiting nearly 100 percent of China's
exports of industrial products to developed countries, with almost one-half of these
products being subject to duty-free treatment. These tremendous market access
opportunities will be underpinned and reinforced by the two cardinal principles of most-
favoured-nation and non-discrimination.
Equally importantly, China will have recourse to a multilateral forum for
discussing trade problems with its WTO partners and, if necessary, to a binding dispute
7settlement procedure if its rights are impaired. This greater level of security will benefit
China immensely - encouraging even greater business confidence, and attracting even
greater levels of investment.
An outward-looking China cannot afford to stand on the sidelines while others
write the rules of the game. A country like China with growing export interests cannot
afford to be left without secure and expanding access to global markets—security which
only the multilateral system provides. And perhaps most important, a China dependent
upon technology and modernization cannot afford to fall behind the fast-moving pace of
globalization
—
particularly in sectors like information technologies, telecommunication,
or financial services which will be the key building blocks of the new economy.
So, China's admission to the WTO will help bring China into the family of globe,
thus decreasing tensions in many areas around the globe. The United States and other
nations should enter a dialogue with China to ensure that its economy becomes even
more externally oriented and interdependent. This should help to ensure future political
stability in Asia.
9
Minister Lee Kuanyew of Singapore argues that, "[a]s China's
economy becomes more externally orientated, it will become interdependent with the
major trading counties of the world." 10 Such interdependence, Lee believes, will make it
"costly for China to risk rupture of economic ties by violating accepted rules and
In fact, once China is in the WTO, Minister Lee Kuanyew fo Singapore believes that there is a greater
likelihood that "[t]he United States... can get China to commit to international rules on trade and
investment." Yang Razali Kassim, Commit China with WTO Entry, Bus. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at 9,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File.
10
See How US, Japan Can Help Integrate China into the World Community, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
Nov. 20, 1996, at 34, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File (reporting text of Senior Minister Lee
Kuanyew of Singapore's speech at the Create 21 Asahi Symposium in Osaka, Japan).
8conventions. This can be a powerful factor to keep it engaged in the international
community." 11 Future economic cooperation between the United States and other major
trading nations with China might lead to greater cooperation in other areas as well.
11 See supra note 9, Lee argues that "China's membership of [sic]the WTO, with a reasonable period of
transition as a developing country, will commit China, first to observe, and second to enforce international
rules on trade and investments."
12 See id
III. Mission unaccomplished: China's application to join the WTO
China was among the original twenty-three signatories in the GATT in 1947. In
October, 1949, the government changed in China as a result of the founding of the
People's Republic of China ("PRC"). Political circumstances prevented the new
government from assuming its seat in the United Nations and other international
organizations, including the GATT. The Republic of China ("ROC"), under the Kuo Min
Tang ("KMT"), which fled to Taiwan after being defeated by the Communists in 1949,
occupied China's seat in the GATT until 1950 when it notified the UN Secretary General
of its decision to withdraw from the GATT. 13 The ROC's withdrawal from the GATT
coincided with its withdrawal from a number of other international organizations
including the UN. 14 Mainland China has never recognized the legitimacy of the ROC
government and therefore regards the ROC's withdrawal invalid. 15
In 1971, the UN restored the right of the PRC to hold seat in the UN assembly and
ousted Taiwan's representative. Additionally, the PRC won a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, it means from that time, the PRC represent China in the world
officially. In 1980, the PRC got admission to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, this signified the beginning of China's return to the world economic
13 The history of withdrawal is summarized in H. Jacobson & M. Oksenberg, China's Participation in the
IMF, the World Bank and GATT 59-63 (1990) and in Robert E. Herzstein, China and the GATT: Legal and
Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1 8 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 371, 402-04 (1986).
14
Lori F. Damrosch, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT, Panel One: GATT Membership in a Chinging World
Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. BUUS. L. REV. 19,21.
15
There is no indication that the PRC contested the legality of the withdrawal at the valid time. Nor did it
attempt to assume the "Chines seats" in the GATT or to observe the legal obligations of the international
agreements associated with the organization. Id. at 21-22.
10
community. 16 Since then, China has joined many international and regional economic
organizations.
17 One conspicuous exception, however, is China's hitherto unsuccessful
effort to gain admission to the GATT and its newly-born successor, the WTO.
In 1 982, China was granted observer status in the GATT. Four years later, in July
1986, China officially notified the GATT Director-General of its intention to resume its
membership in the treaty. Since then, China has made continuous efforts to obtain
approval of its application from the contracting parties. Although China, as a non-
contracting party, participated fully in the Uruguay Round negotiations and signed the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (Final Act) and the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization (MTO Agreement) in Morocco on April 16, 1994, it failed to gain
admission to the GATT during the Uruguay Round as it had expected. China's
subsequent efforts to rejoin GATT during the remainder of 1994, and thus to become a
founding member of the WTO, also proved ineffective. When the WTO came into
existence on January 1, 1995, China was not included in its membership. 19 Although the
16
See supra note 13 H. Jacobson & M. Odsenberg. 57-81 (1990).
17
For a list of international organizations in which China has participated, see Wang Guiguo, China's
Participation in International Organizations, in CHINA FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW: ANALYSIS AND
COMMENTARY (Rui Mu & Wang Guiguo eds., 1990)
18 When the Uruguay Round was formally launched at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, the
Ministers ofCONTRACTING PARTIES gave special permission to allow China to take part in the
negotiations by adopting a provision in the Ministerial Declaration which states that the "[negotiations will
be open t ...countries that have already informed the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at a regular meeting of
the Council of Representatives, of their intention to negotiate the terms of the their membership as a regular
meeting of the Council of Representatives, of their intention to negotiate the terms of their membership as a
contracting party." Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round. Declaration of 20 September 1986, Part
I, para. F(a)(iv), GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 33 rd Supp. 1985-86,
at 27
19
For a list ofWTO Members (January 1,1995), see WTO, FOCUS, No. 1, Jan-Feb., 1995, at 5.
11
WTO granted China observer status on July 11, 1995, the eleventh largest trading
nation in today's world is still exclude from the principal international trade
organization.
As a major event in the restructuring of the post-Cold War international trade
framework. China's application to join GATTAVTO presents a number of difficult
problems in international law, world politics, and the global economic order. It has
generated a great deal of not only multilateral and bilateral negotiations between
concerned nations but also scholarly attention around the world.
20 WTO, FOCUS, No. 4, July 1995, at 1-2
21
In 1994, China ranked eleventh both as exporter and importer in world merchandise trade. See WTO,
FOCUS, No. 2, March-April 1995,at 8.
22
For a general analysis of this process, see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYSTEM (1990).
23 The following articles, selected from a vast literature, deal with important aspects f China's application t
GATTAVTO: Wengou Cai, China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues, J. WORLD
TRADE, Feb, 1992, at 35: Susanna Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the
IV. Major obstacles to China's admission to the WTO
China's economic system is incompatible with principles and practices of the WTO.
A. Trade-related investment measure
1. China currently employs certain trade-related investment measures that limit
foreign access to its domestic market.
For example, China currently limits access to foreign exchange, effectively
preventing investors from removing profits from China in their own currency.24 Foreign
investors are left with profits in local Chinese currency, which is relatively worthless
because it is not freely convertible. In order for profits to be remitted abroad, foreign
investors need to obtain permission from the State Administration of Exchange Controls
(SAEC) and the Bank of China (BOC). This administrative regime hinders foreign
investment; further, it does not meet the strict requirements against TRIMs set by the
WTO.
First, we need to review China's currency mechanism and foreign exchange
measure in the last twenty years.
Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (1994); Donald C. Clarke,
GATT Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517 (1994).
24
See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulation Governing
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Investment, Foreign Enterprises with Foreign Capital and Sino-Foreign
Joint Ventures, art. 16, (approved July 19, 1983, promulgated Aug. 1, 1983), translated in 1 China L. for
Foreign Bus. Reg. (CCH) P 8-610.
25
See John D. Parsons, China's Re-Accession to the GATT and the Impact of the Uruguay Round
Agreement 1 Hong Kong L. Sch. Rev. 52. (1994).
26
See Foreign Exchange Balancing, in China Investment Manual 170, 180 (Donald Lewis ed., 1994); see
also Lucile A. Barole & Thomas E. Jones, Getting Strict with Foreign Exchange, CHINA BUS. REV.,
Sept.12-1994, at 52-53 (noting complicated procedures for foreign companies to convert Chinese currency
into hard currency).
12
13
Before the economic reform started in 1 979, control of Chinese foreign exchange
was wholly concentrated in the hands of the central government. In accordance with a
structure that employed planned directives for managing the economy and a State
monopoly of foreign trade, the central government used administrative instrumentalities
to manage foreign exchange. With the coming of the economic reform, an increasing
number of foreign enterprises and businessmen came to China to make investment or
conduct business operations. To meet the demand of this new development, it soon
became necessary to reform the foreign exchange system. Thus, when China's foreign
trade experienced rapid growth in the 1980s, the central government also relaxed State
control over foreign exchange by decentralizing the management of foreign exchange.
Following same pattern of reform in the foreign trade management area, the
responsibilities for the administration of and the business operation of foreign exchange
were separated. Under the direction of the People's Bank of China, which exercises the
function of the central bank, the State Administration of Exchange Control performs the
administration of foreign exchange, and the Bank of China, China's specialized bank for
foreign exchange, manages the business side of foreign exchange.28
Beginning in the mid-1980s, China carefully constructed a dual-rate currency
mechanism, administering foreign exchange rates through a loose network of exchange
centers or swap centers. By 1989, about eighty swap centers existed throughout China;
they become the only channel through which foreign enterprises, enterprises with foreign
investment, foreign businessmen, and foreign tourists could make currency conversion in
27
See Chen Quangeng, Foreign Exchange Control in China, in CHINA FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW:
Analysis and Commentary, at 3-5 (1990).
28 Mat 18-19.
14
China." The enterprise with foreign investment relied on these centers to acquire RMB
(the Chinese currency) in order to pay local costs, and to exchange their domestic
earnings into hard currency for repatriation. All enterprises, domestic as well as foreign,
acquired their hard currency from these centers to pay for imported goods. By 1993, the
swap centers handled about 80 percent of all current account transactions within China.30
Under this dual-rate system, the People's Bank of China administered two
exchange rates. First, it set an official rate for RMB, which was used by tourists and for
priority imports under the State plan. Second, the bank allowed the swap center
administrators to peg a daily swap center rate, which was allowed to float within a limited
range. This rate was allowed to depreciate relative to the official rate, and thus accurately
reflect supply and demand. 31
Although it was first introduced as a reform measure to decentralize China's foreign
currency management, this dual-rate system soon became a target of international
criticism as being inconsistent with international practice under the GATT. The United
States' Department of Treasury first cited China for "manipulating" its currency in
November 1992, and continued to make this claim throughout 1993. Within the GATT
Working Party, the representatives from the European Community and other developed
countries echoed the US complaints. 32
These criticisms focused on two aspects of the dual-rate exchange system. Both cast
the system as erecting a prohibitive Non Trade Barrier (NTB) for China's foreign trade.
First, it was alleged that the dual-rate worked as a device of government subsidy to a
See Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, at 61 (1992).
China Unifies Exchange Rates, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at 1 1, available in Lexis-Nexis Library,
ALLWLD File.
31
See supra note 29, at 62.
15
selected number of Chinese enterprises conducting imports. While the GATT charter and
the GATT ruling do not specifically outlaw dual-rate currency regimes, they do limit a
nation's ability to restrict imports for the purpose of protecting its balance of payment. 33
By maintaining the artificially imposed difference between the official exchange rate and
the floating swap center rate, it was alleged that the central government was able to
protect certain industries by allowing them to pay for imported commodities at the
overvalued official rate. The military and some selected State-owned enterprises reaped
benefit from this system by paying less than the actual price to purchase imported goods
at a currency loss to be absorbed by the central bank. 34
Second, the dual-rate system was described as a hidden tax on currency trades.
The central bank could target foreigners by forcing them to register their earnings in
China at official rate, which was artificially kept at a much lower ratio than the swap
center rate, but repatriate profits at the swap center rate. Tourists also had to use the
official rate to buy local currency. Foreign investors made their earnings in local currency
and had little or no foreign currency earnings to help pay for needed imports, and thus
had no way to acquire hard currency for repatriation.
So, during the last three years of continuous talks between China and the GATT
Working Party on China's application before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,
32
Chris Brown, China 's GATT Bid: Why All thefuss about currency controls'? 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
57,63-64(1994).
3 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, The Text of the General Agreement, Articles XVII
(1990).
34
See supra note 32, at 61
.
Pamela Baldinger & Anne Stevenson- Yang, Trends and Issues: New Reforms and Taxesfor '94, CHINA
BUS. REV. Jan. 1994, at 4; James McGregor, China Removes Controls on Currency Exchanges, ASIAN
Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1993, at.26, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, MAJPAP File.
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currency controls became a conspicuous point of contention. In direct response to these
criticisms, China's delegates promised in the summer of 1 993 that China would achieve a
single exchange rate within five years, and convertibility shortly thereafter.
But the action turned out to be swifter than the promise. Reflecting the sense of
urgency that mounted as the Uruguay Round drew to close, China moved quickly at the
end of 1993. Only days after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993,
China made the surprising announcement that it was abolishing the dual-rate exchange
system and implementing a unified foreign exchange rate, to come into effect on January
1, 1994. The new unified exchange rate adopted the former swap center rate ofRMB
8.7 yuan (Chinese dollar) per US dollar, thus in effect eliminating the former official rate
of exchange. In the meantime, China abandoned the retention system that allowed certain
enterprises to keep up to 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings and established an
interbank foreign exchange market, in which domestic enterprises are allowed to acquire
hard currency as long as they have the proper import license. Several months later,
China opened a national foreign exchange center in Shanghai which, as the hub of
China's interbank market, is linked to trading centers in other major cities.40
The unification of foreign exchange rates effectively eliminated the government
subsidy to selected industries in buying imported commodities.41 Despite lingering
concerns about performance of the newly erected interbank exchange mechanism, China
36
Talks on China's GATT Membership End; Questions Raised on Currency Proposal, 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 490 (Mar. 24, 1993).
37
See supra note32, at 95.
38 China to Unify RMB Exchange Rate on January, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
December 29, 1993, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
39
China: Central Bank's Note on Foreign Exchange System, BUS. WK. (China Daily Supplement). Jan.
23, 1994, available in Lexis, World Library, ALLWLD File.
40
See National Foreign Exchange Trading Center Opens in Shanghai, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
17
clearly made a major move toward conforming its foreign exchange structure with
international norms. But for the sense of urgency to enter the GATT before the WTO was
officially formed, it is hard to imagine that China would have given up its dual-rate
exchange system in such a dramatic fashion and as early as 1994. In fact, the unification
of the foreign exchange rates came as a surprise to most observers and commentators of
the Chinese economy,42 for in April 1993 China had just institutionalized its dual-rate
system by promulgating comprehensive administrative regulations on the swap market.43
2. In addition, as a planned economy, it is very difficult to see where the state
ends, and private enterprise begins.
The Chinese government engages in extensive amounts of state planning
regarding economic decisions.45 The state plan determines the amount of goods that
China will purchase from abroad. For example, China imposes outright import quotas on
certain products that are set by the state plan.46 Such quotas restrict imports, in violation
41
See supra note 32, at 95.
42
For instance, a commentator wrote in May 1993 that the promulgation of the Regulations on the Foreign
Exchange Swap Market indicates that "within a number of years China will not open up its foreign
currency free [exchange] market." Bi Kexi, Waihui, Fengxian, & Baozhi {Foreign Currency, Risk, And
Hedge]49(1993).
43
Waihui Tiaoji Shichang Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations on Foreign Currency Swap Market], Fagui Huiban
{April 15, 1993) (P.R.C.)
44
See Government Structures, in China Trade and Marketing Manual 181, 182 (Donald Lewis ed., 1994).
See id. At the head of the government is the State council, which is China's highest executive and
administrative organ. Under the State Council, the key governmental body that regulates trade is the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MOFTEC works with the State
Planning Commission (SPC), the Bank of China (BOC), the State Administration of Exchange Control
(SAEC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and
other institutions to create the formal plans at the national level to set import nad export requirements. See
id, the discussion in this section only deals with the myriad rules and plans emanating from the central
government. This, however, represents only a small part of the story. At the local level, the local
Commission on Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (COFTEC) replicates MOFTEC at the national
level. See id, at 182-185. Each province and some large cities have their own COFTECs. In addition, there
are Provincial Planning Commissions (PPC), local Administration of Exchange Controls (AEC), and local
Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC). These institutions create an often overlapping and
confusing set of regulations and state planning that all foreigners must confront in order to do business in or
with China. See id, at 185-187.
46
See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of (visited Mar. 7, 1997).
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of WTO norms. Central planning means that, even if the WTO requires China to lower
tariff rates, the market will not be the factor that determines what goods China will
purchase.
47
Prices will have little effect on which goods are purchased because supply
and demand are determined by government agencies, and not by market forces. Central
planning, then, allows countries like China to circumvent the market liberalization
objectives of the WTO.49
3. A final impermissible TRIM is the restriction imposed by the government on
"the types and number of entities within China, which has the legal right to engage in
international trade."
50
The government restricts most foreign trade in China to that carried out by
Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs). 51 FTCs are state-owned commercial entities that
have the status of legal persons under the law; each FTC deals within a narrowly-defined
business scope. Foreign transactions can be consummated only through approved FTCs.
Before 1979, all foreign trade transactions were carried out by a dozen national
FTCs. Take examples: China National Native Product and Animal By-products Import
and Export Corporation; China National Light Industrial Products Import and Export
Corporation; China National Chemicals Import and Export Corporations; China National
47
See Parsons, supra note 25, at 51. Parsons explains that in market economies the reduction of import
tariffs leads to lower prices and increased competitiveness f the import goods. However, in a NME[non-
market economy] the reduction of tariffs will not have such a cause and effect relationship. In market
economies, relative prices guide export and import decisions of private enterprises. In NMEs, price has
little influence since supply and demand are administratively determined. Tariffs which influence prices,
likewise have influence over the quantity, source and composition of imports. The economy runs according
to the state plan.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
Id
51
See Foreign Trade Corporations, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL, at 178. (Donald Lewis
ed., 1994).
52
See id. at 179. In fact, ifFTCs deal in a commodity that is outside their business scope, that is considered
an ultra vires transaction and the contract is void.
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Machinery Import and Export Corporation; China National Silk Import and
Export Corporation; and China National Tobacco Import and Export Corporation. At
that time, this system served China well because it enabled China to amass the foreign
currency, which was then scarce in China, needed to import materials and equipment for
China's industrialization. However, once China opened up trade to the outside world,
China's leadership realized that this highly centralized foreign trade system was too rigid
to meet the demands of dealing with western countries whose economy and trade regimes
were quite different from its own.
So beginning in the early 1980s, China gradually relinquished the monopoly that
it exercised over foreign trade through a dozen FTCs under its control. Some industrial
ministries under the central government were allowed to set up their own FTCs to
directly conduct foreign trade in goods produced by a network of factories under the
ministries' jurisdictions.53 Meanwhile, provinces and municipalities were authorized to
establish FTCs to handle foreign trade in their respective regions. In addition, some large
and medium production enterprises were given not only the right to export products they
manufactured, but also to import materials and equipment needed for the production.
But all the improvements can not change the monopolization of State-owned
FTCs, The FTCs' monopoly on foreign trade transactions allows them to exert a strong
and wide-ranging influence. The FTCs have created a standard form contract that cannot
be modified by a foreign party and is quite one-sided. 54 For example, risk is shifted to the
Wang Linsheng, China' s Foreign Economic Relations, in China's Socialist Modernization 710, 710-11
(Beijing, Foreign Language Press 1984)
54
See supra note 5 1 ,at 1 80.
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foreign party,55 Chinese companies' liability is severely limited, and a change economic
Policy by the Chinese government does not constitute a force majeure. 56 The Chinese
government controls the FTCs, controls the dispute resolution process, and has the ability
to change economic plans to the detriment of the foreign party. 57
B. Subsidies
The Chinese government gives direct and indirect subsidies to industry. 58 Direct
subsidies include payments to exporters to make up for the lower world market price for
various goods, allowing Chinese companies to export goods at lower prices than they
actually received for them. The government also gives many indirect subsidies to
industry. Chinese entities receive low-priced energy and other raw materials; they also
receive bank loans on preferential terms. 60 The above subsidies violate the WTO because
the Chinese government bears significant aspects of the exporters' costs, making it easier
for them to export goods at a below-market price, and thus to underprice goods from
countries without similar subsidies.
The subsidies have a protective and anti-competitive effect that is antithetical to
the promotion of free trade. It also violates the principle of nondiscrimination of all
55
See Standard Contract ofSales, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL, at 91, 91-94. One of the
most unfair provisions in these standard sales contracts, Section 7, regards the arbitration of trade disputes,
at 93, this section calls for arbitration of trade disputes in "the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade," a governmental entity directly responsible to
the State Council. Id. This would be analogous to the following situation: suppose Sony sells TVs to Circuit
City and a trade dispute arises. If the Sony-Circuit City sales contract contained a provision analogous to
section seven of the standard Chinese sales contract, the dispute must be heard, not in a neutral court, but
by the US Trade Representative, who is responsible to the President. To complete the analogy, one must
also consider that Circuit City would be a government enterprise, under the control of the Executive
Branch.
56
See Contracts-Foreign Related, in CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL, supra note 5 l,at 70. Force
majeure clauses state that there are specific "problems beyond ths reasonable control of the lessee that will
excuse performance." Black's Law Dictionary 645 (1990). They are also referred to as "act of God".
57
See supra note 5 1 , at 70.
58
See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of (visited Mar. 7, 1997).
59 See id.
21
GATT agreements. Although no clause in the GATT text specifies this principle,
nondiscrimination is embodied in the principles of reciprocity, MFN, and national
treatment.
61
It ensures that all benefits conferred upon any contracting party through
multinational or bilateral negotiations should be automatically available to other
contracting parties. What China has done about subsidies has violated the equal treatment
principle.
C. Safeguard measures
China is incompatible with the WTO norms on safeguards because its current
tariff rates are high.
62 The government uses these high tariffs as part of a national policy
to protect certain sectors of the economy from competition. In some particularly
important sectors, like electronic products, cosmetic, and automobile, tariff rates on
goods are often higher than 150%. Although average tariff rates has been declining to
about 44%, it is still higher than international level. Further, the lack of transparency in
China's tariff system^means that the same product may be assessed different tariff rates.
Frequently, special exemptions from the published tariff rates are available, but unknown
to exporters.
When we talk about tariff, let's first review the history of the role of tariffs in
China's economy. Before the mid-1980s, tariffs played only a marginal, if not entirely
negligible, role in China's foreign trade regime. Under the highly centralized foreign
trade system based on central planning and controlled by administrative directives, tariffs
were simply regarded as one of several sources of government revenues.
60
See id.
1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, The Text of The General Agreement, Articles I and
III, at 2-3, 6-7 (1990).
62
See supra note 58.
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For over thirty years, they were collected by the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT)
based on tariff rates that were almost never adjusted. By virtue of the heavy use of
government subsidies for imports and exports in accordance with the arbitrary national
plan, tariff rates were totally divorced from the actual value of the goods in the world
market. Under the national plan, government subsidies for imports and exports were
pervasive. Tariff rates did not reflect the actual value of the goods in the world market
because prices paid by domestic end users of imported goods were not tied to the
international price adjusted for tariffs but to the price of domestic substitute goods.65
Therefore, just as in other centrally planned economies, the role of tariffs was
redundant and had virtually no impact on either the volume of trade or the import and
export decisions. Based on the policy of self-sufficiency and protection of national
industries, the tariff rates were prohibitively high, which in effect stifled the growth of
Chinese foreign trade. Between 1956 and 1977, China's foreign trade amounted to less
than 4 percent of national product, a trade-national product ratio well below those of not
only developed counties but also other large developing countries such as Brazil and
India.
66
Under this central planning system, various related ministries and administrative
commissions directly under the central government managed China's foreign trade.
These ministries and commissions combined business and administrative
63
See id.
64 See id.
65
See Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 at 47 (1992).
66
In 1970, the trade-national-product ration for Brazil and India were 13.6 percent ad 8.7 percent
respectively. IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 1975. See John C. Hsu, China's Foreign Trade
Reform: Impact on Growth and Stability (1989).
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functions. They had full discretion to translate any administrative objectives directly into
business decisions. Therefore, there was practically no need to enact laws and regulations
to legalize the foreign trade management.
One of the central promises of China's economic reform was to reduce the role of
the centralized economic plan and to introduce market mechanisms into the Chinese
economy. As part of this undertaking, the scope of foreign trade planning was diminished
in an effort to decentralize the foreign trade management. In the early 1980s, the State
began to make more active use of tariffs and taxes as trade policy instruments. Reflecting
the heightened status of tariffs in the foreign trade system, China streamlined the
bureaucratic structure of the foreign trade management in the central government. As
early as 1980, the former Customs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was elevated
to a ministerial level entity, the General Administration of Customs. The new agency,
directly under the State Council, became responsible for formulation and administration
of policies, laws, and regulations concerning tariffs. In 1987, the Customs Tariff Rate
Commission, an organ under the Ministry of Finance, was abolished and replaced with a
new Customs Tariff Commission. Chaired by the Ministry of Finance, the Commission
operated as a highly-powered body directly under the State Council. The membership
considered of the chief of the General Administration of Customs and a vice-minister of
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. 69
At the same time, China stepped up its effort to promulgate laws and tariff
schedules in order to make the foreign trade administration more transparent. In 1987, the
Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Zhinan [An Introduction to China's Foreign Economic and Trade
Policis] 35-36, 97=99 (Liu Xiangdong et al. Eds., 1992).
68
Id. At 37.
69
See supra note 65, at 47.
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National People's Congress enacted a comprehensive customs law to replace the interim
law that had governed customs since 1951. The new Customs Law stipulated that all
7
1
"customs schedules shall be published." In 1985 the various import and export tariffs
that had been announced in the previous five years were published in the first
comprehensive tariff schedule released since 1951. Since then, any then, any changes in
tariff rates have been announced in the monthly publication of the General Customs
• • 79
Administration, Zhongguo Haiguan (Chinese Customs) and in the IMF's annual reports.
China also tried to make its tariff system congruent with the standard international
practice by reducing tariffs and assuming more and more obligations embodied in various
international organizations and conventions. In 1983, China joined the Customs
Cooperation Council. But its efforts to reduce tariffs have not been as successful as its
efforts to reform the foreign trade management system. The concern of protecting its
national industries, especially those technology intensive industries such as automobile,
machinery, and electronics, from being destroyed by the sudden influx of imported goods
underscored the cautious course taken by China to reduce the general level of its tariff
rates.
By 1987, the weighted average tariff rate was reduced to 39 percent. Five years
later, however, the unweighted average tariff rate was increased to 42.8 percent. When
weighted by the value of trade in each category (at world price), the average tariff rate
was 31.9 percent. Compared with other large developing countries, this rate was
compatible with those of Brazil (31.9 percent) and Pakistan (35.9 percent), higher than
70 The Laws of the People's Republic of China Annotated, at 1330-1358. (Beijing: Law Publishing House,
1994).
71
Id. at 1332.
72
See supra note 65,at 47.
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those of Argentina (17.1 percent) and Colombia (15.1 percent), but much lower than that
of India (54.8 percent).
74
It was not until the end of 1995 that China decided to reduce its
general tariff rate to 23 percent, effective April 1, 1996. This drastic reduction makes
China's average tariff rate one of the lowest among major developing countries.
D. Import licensing procedure
China is incompatible with the WTO standards regarding the need for
transparency and predictability in licenses. The myriad import licensing requirements
77
have created "an effective import barrier to the Chinese market." No products may be
imported into China without a license, which must be issued by the government.
Government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC) have the power to issue licenses for nearly 50% of all products that are
imported into China, giving the state tremendous power over which products reach the
Chinese marketplace. 79 The worst abuses occur when a government ministry in charge of
a Chinese manufacturer of a particular product also oversees the import regulations
on
imposed on similar products produced abroad.
It's interesting to note that China restored the use of licensing in foreign trade in
the early 1980s as a measure to reduce the scope of the mandatory import and export
plan. When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, it adopted the policy of
using-licensing to control all imports and exports. But this policy was abandoned in the
'3 Yvonne Chan, Understanding the TariffSystem, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Nov-Dec. 1987, at 46, 48.
74 World Bank, China: Foreign Trade Reform 1994 at 56 (1994).
75
Gaingehetiaozhieng Jinkou Shuishou Zhengee [Reforming and Adjusting Import Tax Policy], Renmin
Ribao [The People's Daily], Dec. 29, 1995, at 1.
See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of (visited Mar. 7, 1997).
77
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See Import and Export Controls, CHINA BUS. L. GUIDE (CCH Int'l) P80-252, at 82, 201-282, 501 (Sally
A. Harpole ed., 1991).
9
See supra note 76.
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mid-1950s when the centralized foreign trade system based upon the mandatory national
O 1
plan was firmly established. After the economic reform began, the licensing system was
reinstituted as a means to displace the function of the mandatory plan as well as to serve
the purpose of balance of payments and protecting domestic industries. ~
As of 1992, 53 goods were subject to import licensing. J Since then, China has
reduced the number of goods subject to import licensing on several occasions. As a
result, the effective application of licensing in China has been limited to a scope
essentially compatible with most countries which have GATTAVTO membership. 8 "
E. Protection for intellectual property
China is not in compliance with basic protection for intellectual property required by
the WTO. Even after signing the 1992 memorandum of understanding with the United
States, China has failed to enforce international intellectual property standards.
80
See id.
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See supra note 67, at 97-99.
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Guojia Jinchukou Guanliweryuanhui He Duiwai Maoyibu Chukouxudezheng Zhidu Zanying Banfa [The
Interim Measures for the Export Licensing System by the State Import and Export Control commission and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade]. Zhongguo Shewai Jingji Falu Huibian (1949-1985) [A Collection of
China's Foreign Economic Laws and Regulations], at 467-469.
83
See supra note 67, at 100, 183-186.
84 Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], May 27, 1994 atl. Following the lifting of import control on 283 goods
at the end of 1993, China abolished import licensing and quotas for 195 goods in May 1994. Id. In January
1996, China again lifted import control on 176 goods. Shenhua Jikou Tizhi Gaige [Deepening the Import
system Reform], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], January 3, 1996, at 2.
85
Despite the continuous efforts by GATT members to eliminate the use of quotas and licensing in their
respective foreign trade regimes, these efforts have yet to achieve the proclaimed goal of eradicating
licensing and quotas in the world trade system . See Jackson, The World Trading System, at 129 (1989).
86
See supra note 58.
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See Geoffrey Crothall, Close All Pirate CD Factories, US insists, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 22,
1994, Business Section, at 1. For instance, in 1994, there were 26 CD plants in China which produced a
total output of 75 million counterfeit compact discs each year. See id. This has led to an investigation of
China's intellectual property practices pursuant to the US Trade Act's Special 301 provision. See id. In
1992, the US Customs Service seized over S120 million in counterfeit goods coming from China. See id.
Further, China has not improved access to its market for foreign audiovisual, sound recording and software
companies.
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1 . China's current intellectual property protection laws
Since 1982, China has enacted several intellectual property protection laws and
og
joined various international intellectual property conventions. Growing pressure from
Western nations, and a desire on the part of the Chinese to improve protection of their
QQ
own intellectual property, led to the enactment of such laws. Accordingly, China
enacted Trademark, Patent, and Copyright laws, as well as Computer Software
regulations. China also enacted International Copyright Treaty Implementing Rules that
modified portions of the Copyright Law and Computer Software Regulations,
harmonizing these laws with the Berne Convention. A separate Unfair Competition
Law, enacted in 1993, provides additional protection for well-known or unique brand
names.
91
2. The 1995 Accord
Despite China's enactment of intellectual property protection laws, piracy continued
unabated into 1995. Piracy of items such as CDs and computer software was
widespread. Consequently, the United States threatened to retaliate by imposing tariffs
on Chinese exports. Further, China wanted to be a founding member of the GATT's
successor organization, the World Trade Organization. The goal of the 1 995 Accord was
to open China's market to certain U.S. products, and to create a mechanism guaranteeing
See Michael D. Pendleton, Chinese Intellectual Property—Some Global Implicationsfor Legal Culture
and National Sovereignty, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 19 (1993) (listing several intellectual property
laws China has enacted since 1982).
89
See id. at 120.
Tan Loke Khoon, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law in the People 's Republic ofChina,
15 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 176, 178 (1993).
91 Zheng Chengsi, The First Unfair Competition Law ofthe PRC, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 181 (1994).
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See Seth Faison, Razors, Soap, Cornflakes: Pirating Spreads in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al.
93
See David E. Sanger, President Impose Trade Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995 at
Al.
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the vigorous enforcement of China's intellectual property laws.94 The Accord contains an
Agreement Letter enumerating certain mutual responsibilities and an Action Plan
enumerating the steps China is to take to enforce its intellectual property laws.93
a. History of the 1995 Accord
On February 4, 1995, the United States imposed the largest trade sanctions in US
history when it levied one hundred percent punitive tariffs on US$1.08 billion of Chinese
exports.
96 The action was prompted by China's refusal to crack down on the extensive
piracy of American computer software, movies and music, and by China's inability or
unwillingness to enforce laws protecting intellectual property. China responded to the
sanctions by announcing retaliatory tariffs against American exports, such as compact
discs and cigarettes. China further announced that it would suspend talks with US
companies regarding automobile joint ventures, and that it would withhold approval for
US manufactures of audio-visual products to open branch offices in China.98 Three weeks
later, however, on February 26, 1995, the day both governments' sanction were to take
effect, a trade war was averted when the United States and China signed an accord on the
protection of intellectual property rights and market access. This Accord has been
described as the most comprehensive copyright enforcement agreement the United States
has ever negotiated, and was hailed as a victory for the Clinton Administration's
strategy with China. The Accord promised a six-month crackdown by China on copyright
Seth Faison, U.S. and China Sign Accord to End Piracy ofSoftware, Music Recordings and Film, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al.
95
See id.
96
See supra note 93 at Al, The US trade sanctions imposed on China consisted of 100% punitive tariffs on
$1.08 billion of Chinese exports, which included items such as: plastic articles, cellular telephones and
answering machines, sporting goods, bicycles, and other goods such as footwear, and winter apparel.
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violators, starting two days after the signing of the Accord. The Accord also includes
China's pledge to open its market to United States' movies, music, and computer software
by immediately removing all import quotas on these American products. 100
American business leaders responded to the Accord with a combination of praise
and caution. 101 While many welcomed the Accord and predicted that it would lead to
increased US media company investment in China, others warned that China's resolve to
enforce the new anti-piracy laws would be crucial.
In broad terms, five industry groups are most likely to directly benefit from the
Accord: the US computer software industry, the US audio-visual industry, the US
publishing industry, US patent-based industries, and US manufacturers of well-known
products. The Accord contains three Chinese government commitments: to take
immediate steps to address piracy throughout China, to make long-term changes to
ensure effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, and to provide US rights-
holders with enhanced access to the Chinese market. 104
The 1995 Accord consists of two documents. First, the Accord contains a letter
from China's Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Minister Wu Yi, to
the United States Trade representative, Michael Kantor("Agreement Letter"). Second, the
Accord contains an Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights in China ("Action Plan").
100
Id.
101 David C. Johnston, US Business Favors Deal, With Caution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1995, at D6.
102
See id. at D6.
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b. The Agreement Letter
The Agreement Letter summarizes the intent and details of the Action Plan,
addresses several additional issues not contained in the Plan, and makes a number of
assurances.
105
For example, China pledges to increase cooperation and trade in products
protected by intellectual property rights, and to approve the establishment of a
representative office of the International Federation of Phonogram Industries('TFPI"). 106
Further more, China pledges not to impose quotas, import license requirements, or other
formal or informal restrictions on the importation of audio-visual and published products
and promised to permit US entities to establish joint ventures with Chinese entities in
China for the production and reproduction of audio-video products. These joint ventures
will be permitted to enter into contracts with Chinese publishing enterprises for
distributing, selling, displaying, and performing throughout China. Joint ventures will
be permitted immediately in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities, with the
number of cities expanding to thirteen by the year 2000. Joint ventures will also be
permitted in the computer software sector for the production and sale of computer
software and computer software products. The Agreement Letter also permits revenue
sharing arrangements.
l
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United States and China Reach Accord on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Market Access,
Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release, Feb. 26, 1995, at 5.
m See id at 3.
105 China-United States: Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, Letter from Wu
Yi, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, People's Republic of China, to Michael Kantor,
United States Trade Representative, United States of America, 34 I.L.M. 881.
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See id. at 884.
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Id. "China will continue to permit US individuals and entities to enter into revenue sharing arrangements
with Chinese entities. Permissible arrangements will include, for example, licensing agreements under
which the US entity receives a negotiated percentage of revenues generated by film products."
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c. The Action Plan
The Action Plan is annexed to the Agreement Letter, and was developed to provide
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. 109 The plan requires all
levels of the Chinese Government to participate in its implementation. Additionally, the
Action Plan articulates immediate short-term and long-term effects. The Action Plan is
divided into two main sections, an intellectual property rights enforcement structure
("Enforcement Structure"), and provisions for intellectual property rights' information
dissemination and training. 110
3. Impediments to effective intellectual property rights enforcement in China
China's laws governing intellectual property protection contain impediments to their
effective implementation. These impediments include: inherent ambiguities and
"loopholes" in China's laws, procedural impediments, lax enforcement, and market
barriers. China's Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Computer Software Regulations, are all
vulnerable to these impediments.
a. Ambiguities and Loopholes in Intellectual Property Protection
China's intellectual property laws contain ambiguities and loopholes that may
impede effective intellectual property rights enforcement. 111 Such impediments hinder
enforcement and erode protection, these ambiguities and loopholes exist in China's Patent
Law, Copyright Law, and Computer Software Regulations.
109
China-United States: Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, Annex, 34
I.L.M. 881,887.
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( 1 ) The Patent Laws
Commentators have criticized China's Patent Law for containing ambiguities and
loopholes.
112
First, infringement is not specifically defined in the Patent Law.
113
Additionally, the Patent Law contains ambiguous and broad language. 114 For example, if
someone uses or sells a patented product not knowing that it was made and sold without
the authorization of the patentee, that person is not liable for patent infringement. 115
Under this exception, only actual notice is sufficient to protect a patent, because such a
showing frequently requires an extremely high, if not impossible, burden of proof, this
exception seriously erodes patent protection. 116 The Patent Law's ambiguous definition of
the scope of use under the exception for non-authorized use of a patent in scientific
research also hinders enforcement.
117 The scarcity of lawyers in China, both in the
profession and in the patent field, exacerbates these problems.
(2) The Copyright Laws
As with the Patent Law, the Copyright Law's ambiguous and overly broad language
has been criticized for a long time. 119 For example, while the Copyright Law provides
protection for works by non-Chinese authors, it is uncertain whether the definition of a
non-Chinese person includes non-Chinese corporations. Furthermore, many terms in the
111 See Jeanette L. Pinard & Lian Chun-Cheng, Patent Protection Under Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69,
86 (1987).
112
See id., at 86.
See Jianyang Yu, People's Republic ofChina, in International Patent Litigation: A Country-by-Country
Analysis 1, 2 (Michael N. Miller ed., 1994) (providing criticism of China's patent protection).
114
See supra note 96 at 86.
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Patent Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 62, at 14,229.
116
See Laurence P. Harrington, Recent Amendments to China's Patent Law: The Emperor's New Clothes?,
17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 356-57 (1994).
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See supra note 96 at I
118 See supra note 1 1 , a
to enforce patient rights.
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86.
01, t 356. This scarcity of trained lawyers creates problems in using the Chinese courts
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Law are not defined. 120 The Copyright Law is also silent regarding the status of citizens
in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Additional criticisms address the Copyrights Law's
lack of the right of assignment. This silence led to the accepted view that assignments
i 77
of copyrights are prohibited in China. Critics also point out that while the Copyright
Law provides that disputes may be settled by mediation, there are no guidelines as to who
17^
may qualify as a mediator.
(3). Computer Software Regulations
Critics argue that China's Software Regulations show many of the same
shortcomings as the Patent and Copyright Laws. 124 Additionally, it is uncertain whether
specific provisions of the Copyright Law apply to software. Similarly, as with the Patent
and Copyright Laws, many criticize the Regulations' ambiguous language and lack of
1 7S
definitions.
1 7A
The Regulations' numerous fair use exceptions are also criticized. This criticism
stems from the combination of ambiguous language and the fact the government
1 77
institutions purchase large quantities of software. Many fear that these large
government purchases will result in future struggles surrounding the fair use exceptions.
119
See Li Xiang Sheng, Trade Mark Infringement in China, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 171 (1990).
Regarding the Copyright Law, "[s]ome of its language is ambiguous, some fundamental questions are not
answered and the commercial viability of exploiting copyright works is uncertain."
Zheng Chengsi, Special Features, Merits and Shortcomings ofChina's Lawsfor Intellectual Property
ProtectionfPart II), CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS, April 1994, at 16.
121 See Li Xiang Sheng, Trade Mark Infringement in China, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 448 (1990)
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124 See David B. Kay, PRC Regulationsfor the Protection ofComputer Software, IP ASIA, June 1991, at
22.
See id. At 22,23 Ambiguous language and undefined terms found in the Software Regulations include:
"small number of copies" and "non-commercial purposes."
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Similarly, many fear that the fair use exception covering "similar software" could be
used as a defense in software infringement actions. Critics also deride the Regulations'
lack of retroactivity, and the inability of software developers to register software
published prior to the enactment of the Regulations. Indeed, the practice of software
infringement is so widespread that a loophole was created in the Regulations, exempting
software published prior to the Regulations' enactment from the registration
requirement. 130
b. Procedural Impediments to Intellectual Property Protection
Procedural impediments pose a hinderance to effective intellectual property
rights protection, separate and distinct from that of the aforementioned criticisms. The
inadequacy of the procedures through which intellectual property disputes are handled
may constitute a major impediment to effective protection. For example, a conflict of
interest may exist in the patent administrative agency's defined roles as both
administrator and adjudicator. The Administrative Authority for Patent
Affairs("AAPA") must act as an administrative court for adjudicating patent disputes for
those pursuing the AAPA route, and as a government agency for day to day patent
administration. If a patentee decides, therefore, to turn first to the AAPA to resolve a
patent dispute, the patentee may be before a biased judiciary. 134 Furthermore, the AAPA
128
See Software Regulations, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 BUSINESS REGULATION (CCH), art. 3 1,
at 14,707 (providing fair use exceptions).
n9See supra note 109, at 27, 30.
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See supra note 98, at 304-07 (discussing procedural impediments to effective intellectual property
protection in China)
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Id. at 302: see Patent Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 BUSINESS REGULATION (CCH), art. 60,
at 14,227.
See supra note 98, at 304. The AAPA's involvement in patent administration may conflict with its role
as an administrative court, and its impartial handling of patent infringement disputes may be "compromised
due to its dual functions and its position in the administrative structure."
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is subordinate to the executive authority of the region and is, therefore, subject to local
protectionist pressure, compromising its impartiality. 133
Administrative agencies also lack the procedural authority to handle patent
infringement cases.
136
Thus, the AAPA lacks the power to investigate and collect patent
infringement evidence and cannot issue preliminary injunctions. Additionally,
administrative agencies are not empowered to enforce their own decisions.
Litigation proceedings in Chinese courts are also problematic. For example, under
China's Civil Procedure Law (" Civil Procedure Law") the responsibility for
discovering and collecting evidence rests primarily with the court. The Civil
Procedure Law, however, requires a party to present evidence to support its claims. 140
Consequently, a party may need to rely on the court to order the opposing party to
provide required evidence. 141 Since neither the party nor its lawyers are granted
enforceable rights to collect evidence, the party's lawyer is limited to reviewing the
court's records.
142
Critics also argue that procedural problems emerged as a result of the
135
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Id. If an AAPA decision is appealed and error on the part of the AAPA is proven, the Court will refuse
to enforce the order unless the AAPA rectifies the alleged error. When the AAPA insists that its order was
correct despite the Court's holding to the contrary, therefore, the AAPA order remains unenforced. Further
compounding this problem is that no procedure governs the resolution of such a disagreement between the
AAPA and the court.
138 Code of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China (1991), translated in China Laws for Foreign
Business, 3 Business Regulation, P 19-201, 23,891 (CCH Int'l 1992)
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Civil Procedure Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 64, at
23,919. This article reads in pertinent part: "if a people's court considers certain evidence to be fo relevance
to a case, the people's court shall itself collect and examine evidence"
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Civil Procedure Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulaiton, art. 64, at 23,919.
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promulgation of China's Administrative Litigation Law ("Administrative Law"). 1 3
Specifically, when an AAPA decision is appealed to a court, neither the Administrative
Litigation Law nor the Civil Procedure Law indicates which law applies. 144
c. Lax Enforcement of Intellectual Property Protection Laws
Lax enforcement is evident in the widespread piracy of copyrighted works. 145
Despite the new copyright regulations, piracy in China remains rampant. 14 Critics of
China's lax enforcement point to the existence of twenty-six CD and LD factories in
Central and South China. 147 The production capacity of these factories is seventy-five
million units per year, although the domestic demand is only five million units per
year. Critics, therefore, believe that these factories export over fifty million pirated
CDs and LDs annually. Efforts to close these factories have failed. Critics further
speculate that many of these plants are closely connected to senior Chinese Government
officials.
Commentators also note that Chinese factories and State-Owned Enterprises
("SOEs") play a prominent role in producing and distributing pirated video games. 149
143 Law of Administrative Litigation of the People's Republic of China (1989), translated in China Laws for
Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulation, P 19-558, 24,551 (CCH Int'l 1989)
144
See Jianyang Yu, Review ofPatent Infringement Litigation in the People 's Republic ofChina, 5 J.
Chinese L. 297, 304-07 (1991). This ambiguity is significant because the applicable law determines the
parties on appeal. For example, under the Civil Procedure Law, the patentee and the alleged infringer are
the parties to both the patent infringement action and the appellate action. Under the Administrative Law,
however, the parties would be the party dissatisfied with the prior decision and the AAPA. Therefore, the
party prevailing in the first instance must rely on the AAPA to defend its interests.
145
See United States Trade Representative, 1994 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
51 (1994) (discussing China's lax enforcement of intellectual property protection).
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Id.
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Id. In fact, pirated goods are "omnipresent in China's major commercial centers."
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See id.
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Letter from James L. Bikoff, Esq., Alter & Hadden, to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, Section 301
Committee, Office of the US Trade Representative 2 (Aug. 9, 1994) (commenting on video game piracy in
China, in response to the Special 301 investigation). Infringing Nintendo video games in China have caused
losses to the video game industry estimated between US$200 million and US$1.2 billion. It has also been
estimated that over 20,000,000 counterfeit Nintendo video game 8-bit hardware and at least 60,000,000
counterfeit Nintendo 8-bit video games were sold in China before July 18, 1994. Letter from James L.
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These SOEs openly advertise their infringing products throughout China, and like the
CD factories, are believed to export large quantities of infringing video games to the rest
of the world. 150 Furthermore, the titles of many of the infringing games are based on US
movie or character titles, thereby infringing the trademarks and copyrights of many US
companies. 151
Critics further argue that piracy is wide spread in China's television industry.
There are over five hundred television stations in China that broadcast US motion
pictures without the authorization of the Motion Picture Association ("MPA").
Furthermore, pirated and/or unauthorized MPA products, 154 are openly used for
programming by hundreds of cable systems and are routinely shown on the in-house
movie systems of major Chinese hotels. Infringing products are also shown in Chinese
mini-theaters throughout China. 155
According to the US Trade Representative's office, the impotence of China's
designated copyright enforcement agency, the NCA, compounds this lax enforcement. 156
i en
The NCA is under-staffed and poorly funded, and has no clearly designated function.
Moreover, the NCA can only enforce laws and regulations with the assistance of local
ministries, many of which often have a financial stake in the pirating activities. Conflicts
of interest exist throughout the entire enforcement structure, and, consequently, powerful
Bikoff, Esq. and David I. Wilson, Esq., Arter & Hadden, to Carolyn Frank, Secretary, Trade Policy Staff
Committee, office of the United States Trade Representative 1 (July 18, 1994) (concerning market access
problems regarding video games in China).
150
Id
151 Id
152 Motion Picture Association, Trade Barriers to Exports ofUS Filmed Entertainment: 1995 Report to the
United States Trade Representative 153 (1995)
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Id
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Id
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Motion Picture Association member company titles can often be found in China within a few weeks of
their theatrical release in the United States.
156 See supra note 1 30, at 5 1
.
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local interests are able to rebuff Central Government investigations into piracy. 158 Even
when local authorities are not directly involved in the pirating activities, enforcement is
often hampered by local authorities who are not more interested in encouraging
investment and economic development than enforcing intellectual property laws. 159
Similar problems persist in the enforcement trademark protection despite the revised
laws and new criminal penalties. 160 Direct access to administrative remedies and the
courts is denied to non-Chinese persons, with non-Chinese petitioners forced to work
through five designated agents,
161
who often appear to have direct ties to the infringers. 162
Critics deplore both the prolonged duration of investigations, during which US
companies are denied information on the status of the investigations, and the practice of
arriving at solutions through "back door" processes that ignore due process and principles
of transparent justice. As with copyright protection, the courts are often influenced by
local interests, thus further eroding the courts' impartiality.
d. Market Barriers Undermine Intellectual Property Protection
China maintains a shadowy and unwritten system of quotas for films, video, and
television.
164
There are de facto bans on non-Chinese ownership in joint ventures for
producing and distributing recorded music, ! 5 and also on establishing joint ventures for
157
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See id at 52.
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See supra note 130, at 52.
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See supra note 140, at 152.
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See Letter from Eric H. Smith, Executive Director and General Counsel, International Intellectual
Property Alliance, to Frederick Montgomery, Chairman, TPSC, Office of the US Trade Representative 3-6
(July 13, 1994). (regarding public comments on market access issues related to China's participation in
GATT and WTO).
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publishing.
166
There is also an informal quota on the number of non-Chinese recordings
that can be released annually in China.
167
Additionally, while an import license is
required to import books into China, these licenses are not available to non-Chinese
publishers. Non-Chinese publishers are not permitted to prepare translations of their
books: instead, they must have their books translated and published locally. China also
imposes export performance requirements on US products manufactured in China, and
imposes prohibitive tariff rates for many imported US products. 1
Commentators argue that these market access barriers facilitate intellectual property
piracy and impede enforcement. 170 The prohibitive tariff rates discourage the importation
into China of authentic goods, leading to the saturation of the Chinese market with
infringing products.
171
Consequently, foreign licenses are unable to compete in China due
to the presence of large quantities of these infringing products. Preventing full market
access thus limits supply in the face of a rising demand that can only be satisfied by
pirated copies of the product.
166
Id. at 5.
167
Id, at 4. As of July, 1994, the quota was 120 foreign record releases per year.
168
See supra note 134, at 2. The export performance requirements reduce the numbers of genuine products
manufactured in China which are retained for sale in China. For example, only about thirty percent of the
production of one of Nintendo's two manufacturing partners in China can be retained for sale in China.
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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Submission of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America for the "Special 301" Report on Intellectual Property Protection 3 (Feb. 13,
1995). As of Frebruary, 1995, China's tariff rates for pharmaceutical products was approximately fifteen to
twenty percent. Similarly, as of July, 1994, there was a fifty percent tariff on video games and video game
equipment.
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4. The 1995 Accord should be modified because it fails to address many of the
impediments to effective intellectual property protection in China
China's laws and the enforcement of these laws do not meet the international
standards in TRIPs.
174
Futhermore, the 1995 Accord is silent regarding impediments
other than enforcement, such as ambiguities in the laws and fair use exceptions. The 1995
Accord, however, does provide procedural reforms and expanded enforcement measures.
There is little prospect, however, that the 1995 Accord will immediately bring China's
intellectual property protection up to international standards.
a. China's Intellectual Property Protection Laws Fail to Meet the International
Standards Embodied in TRIPs
China's intellectual property protection does not include many of the elements
required in TRIPs: China does not expressly extend Berne Convention protection to
computer software, China's laws are silent on trade secrets, and the Patent Law probably
will not provide for the protection of layout-designs of integrated circuits as required by
TRIPs. There are also several gaps between the enforcement standards articulated in
TRIPs and China's enforcement provisions, particularly, procedures for remedying acts
of infringement, written decisions and evidence, injunctive relief, and damages.
(1) Berne Convention Protection of Computer Software
TRIPs requires parties to extend Berne Convention protection of literary works to
1 7^
computer software. China does not, however, expressly extend Bernes Convention
173
Id. at 2.
174
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1 197, in General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1 125, Annex 1C.
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See id. Art 1091), 33, I.L.M., at 1201.
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protection to computer software.
176
While China's Copyright Law provides copyright
protection for computer software,
177
such protection has been ineffective and impartial,
and contains no reference to the Berne Convention. While the Software Regulations
aim to fill the loopholes left by the Copyright Law, again, no references are made to
providing Berne Convention protection to computer software. Although China acceded to
the Berne Convention in June, 1993, 179 the Berne Convention does not require that China,
as a party to the Convention, extend such protection to computer sorftware. In light of
China's failure to include references to the Berne Convention in either of its two
principles software copyright protection laws, one may conclude that China does not
extend Berne Convention protection.
(2) Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits
TRIPs requires intellectual property protection of layout-designs of integrated
circuits. China's laws, however, provide no such protection. Because topographies are
considered unique and distinct from patentable subject matters, they require a sui generis
I OA
form of protection. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Patent Law's protection of
1 O 1
"inventions-creations," meaning inventions, utility models, and designs, covers this sui
generis subject-matter. Furthermore, unlike China's supplementary provisions for
protecting computer software protection, no supplementary provisions have been enacted
176
See Software Regulations, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), arts, 9-29,
at 14,685-705 (outlining protection given to computer software).
77
Copyright Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), art.3(8), at 14,563.
1 8 Henry Hong Liu, Legislative Update-Legal Aspects ofSoftware Protection in China: The Computer
Software Protection Regulations, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, app. (1993)
179 China acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in June, 1993.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 186, 168 Parry's T.S.
185, revised Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 218, revised June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, revised June 26, 1948,
331 U.N.T.S. 217, revised July 14, 1967, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
180
See Transnational Corporations and Management Divisions of the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Development, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment 32, UN
Doc. ST/CTC/SER. A/24, UN Sales No. E. 93. II. A. 10 (1993).
42
to protect layout-designs.
182
Consequently, topographies of integrated circuits continue to
go unprotected in China.
(3) Protection of Trade Secrets
TRIPs require parties to provide protection for trade secrets. China's
intellectual property laws are silent on this issue, and no existing Chinese laws currently
exist for protecting trade secrets. The seriousness of this omission is underscored by the
fact that a majority of working technologies are based on trade secrets, and that it has
been reported that trade secrets were of great importance for nearly seventy percent of the
affected sales, second in importance only to trademarks.
(4). Judicial and Administrative Provisions
China's intellectual property laws do not fulfill all of the enforcement measures
required by TRIPs. China's laws are deficient with respect to procedures for remedying
acts of infringement, written decisions and evidence, injunctive relief, and damages.
Although China's laws are less deficient with respect to damages, they still are not fully
consistent with TRIPs.
First, procedures to remedy acts of infringement. TRIPs requires that remedies for
acts of infringement be decided on the merits of the case, preferably in writing, and based
only on evidence that the parties had the opportunity to present. TRIPs also requires
that defendants be given timely, detailed, written notice of enforcement proceedings, with
all parties allowed to present all relevant evidence. China's intellectual property
protection laws do not provide detailed procedures, and it is unclear whether such
181
182
See Patent Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 2, at 14,201.
See Software Regulations, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), P 1 1-704, at
14,681.
183
See supra note 174, at 1212.
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procedures are provided by China's Civil procedure or Administrative Litigation Laws.
For example, both the Civil procedure and Administrative Litigation Laws include
provisions for serving notice of claims, but such notice is only minimal, and it is unclear
whether it would satisfy the TRIPs mandate. The Civil Procedure Law requires only that
a procedural document be served directly on the person to be served, and the
Administrative Law similarly states that the People's Court shall send a copy of the
complaint to the defendant within five days of the date on which the case is accepted. It is
not clear whether these procedures fulfill the TRIPs requirements of timely and detailed
written notice.
186
Second, TRIPs prefers written decisions and the opportunity to offer evidence.
Again, China's intellectual property protection laws make no reference to these
procedural matters, so one must turn to the Civil Procedure and Administrative Litigation
laws. With regards to provisions requiring written decisions, the Administrative Law
makes no mention of how decisions are to be made, the Civil Procedure Law states only
that judgements and rulings made in writing should contain the cause of the action, the
facts and reasons ascertained in the judgement, including the applicable law, and the
1 R8
result of the judgement. The Civil Procedure Law, however, does not require written
decisions; in fact, it provides for nonwritten decisions by allowing verbal rulings to be
entered in the written record.
184
See supra note 180, at 32.
185 See supra note 174, art 41.
186
See Administrative Litigation law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulation (CCH), art.
43, at 24,573.
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See supra note 174, art 41.
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Civil Procedure Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 138, at
23,951.
189M art 140, at 23,95 1-53.
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With respect to the opportunity to present all relevant evidence in a dispute, China's
laws are inconsistent with the TRIPs standards. As discussed above, the power to collect
evidence in Chinese cases resides with the court. While the Civil Procedure Law provides
that a party is responsible for providing evidence in support of its allegations, he means
of obtaining this evidence is greatly limited, if not nonexistent.
l
Usually, only the court
has the right to investigate and collect evidence. 1 * The Administrative Litigation Law
contains similar provisions, plus one that bars the defendant from collecting evidence
from the plaintiff or witness on its own during the proceedings.
Third, injunctive relief. TRIPs requires that courts be authorized to order
preliminary injunctive relief. Such relief would require an infringer to cease all
infringing activities during the course of the proceedings. China's intellectual property
laws do not provide for injunctive relief. Instead, Chinese courts may only order an
infringer to cease the infringing activity after a judgement of infringement is entered. 194
Additionally, neither the Civil Procedure Law nor the Administrative Litigation Laws
expressly authorize preliminary injunctions. It has been suggested that injunctive relief
could be made available pursuant to Articles 92 and 94 of the Civil Procedure Law,
which provide that courts may grant provisional property remedies using other forms
190
Civil Procedure Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 64, at
23,919.
191
See id.
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Administrative Litigation Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 3 Business RegulationfCCH), art. 33,
at 24,561.
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See supra note 174, art 44, 33.
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Trademark Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 39, at 14,063.
Patent Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), art. 60, at 14,227; Copyright
Law, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation(CCH), art.45, at 14,587.
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permitted by law for reasons other than ensuring the execution of a court judgement. 195
The fact, however, is that clear and unambiguous provisions for injunctive relief are not
provided by Chinese laws.
Fourth, damages. TRIPs provides that authorities should have the right to order
infringers to pay the right-holder damages to adequately compensate for injuries suffered,
including attorneys fees, as well as the right to recover the profits from the infringing act
and the right to dispose of the infringing goods.
196 TRIPs also provides that these
remedies should be severe, to deter further infringements. TRIPs further require criminal
penalties in cases of trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.
197
China's intellectual property laws do provide for remedies as prescribed by
TRIPs such as, destroying the infringing goods and ordering the infringer to compensate
the right-holder. While criminal penalties exist for commercial copyright piracy and
trademark counterfeiting, 198 there is reason to doubt that the remedies proposed by
Chinese officials are actually meant to serve as deterrents. 199 In one recent case involving
Microsoft, an infringer illegally copied and exported over 220,000 copies for a computer
operating system, resulting in US$22 million in lost revenues for the right-holder. The
Chinese court, however, fined the infringer US$260,200 Such penalties are unlikely to
deter further infringements.
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See supra note 190, arts. 93, 94, at 23,929.
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See Microsoft Seeks Z22 Million in Chinese Pirating Case, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK April 14,
1994. Available in WESTLAW (reporting that infringer responsible for counterfeiting 220,000 unites of
computer software, costing US manufacture US$22 million in lost revenues, was fined just US$260 by
Chinses court).
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Microsoft "Disappointed" Over Chinese Software Ruling, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 4, 1994,
available in WESTLAW: Microsoft Seeks $22 Million In Chinese Pirating Case.
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b. Impediments Remain Unaddressed by the 1995 Accord
The 1995 Accord does not address all of the impediments to effectively
implementing China's intellectual property laws. Unfortunately, the Accord is silent with
respect to the many ambiguities and loopholes in China's intellectual property laws, as
well as the problem of China's market barriers. The Accord, however, does provide for
procedural reforms and significantly expands enforcement measures.
(1) Ambiguities in the Laws and Market Barriers Persist
The Accord is silent with respect to the ambiguities, lack of definition, loopholes,
fair use exceptions, and related weaknesses inherent in China's current intellectual
property laws. For example, patent infringement remains undefined, "lack of
knowledge" may still be used as a defense to an infringement charge, and the Accord
does not clarify whether a non-Chinese person includes a non-Chinese corporation.
Terms such as "create" and "plagiarize" remain undefined, and the status of Hong Kong
and Taiwanese nationals remains in doubt.
Furthermore, it is still not clear whether the Copyright Law applies to software,203
and if it does, the terms "small number of copies" and "non-commercial purposes"
remain undefined and ambiguous. Additionally, the Software Regulations still do not
cover items published prior to the law's enactment. 204 Similarly, market barriers to
intellectual property rights protection, such as the "shadowy" quotas for films, or
201
See supra note 174, art.41,33 I.L.M. at 1213. "Members shall ensure that enforcement
procedures... [includel remedies to prevent further infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent
to further infringements."
202
See supra note 144.
203
See supra note 124.
204
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prohibitive tariffs that impede the import of legitimate merchandise and thus indirectly
encourage the growth of pirated products, are only touched on in the Agreement Letter
itself.
205
(2) Procedural Reforms and the Enhancement of Enforcement Provisions
The Accord should materially reduce several major procedural impediments to
intellectual property rights protection in China. The most significant procedural change is
found in the subsection expanding the administrative agencies' enforcement powers.
Specifically, prior to the Accord, administrative agencies, like the AAPA, often had the
dual role of administrator and adjudicator in intellectual property matters without any
enforcement powers. The question of whether the Civil Procedure Law or Administrative
Litigation Laws apply when an agency decision is appealed is not answered directly by
the Accord, but non-Chinese right-holders are now permitted to legally collect
information, thereby removing a glaring procedural impediment.
If the 1995 Accord is faithfully implemented by China's authorities, it should
have its greatest impact in the area of enforcement. The Accord's requirement of
manufacturing licensing and provision for title verification systems, may well reduce the
activities of even state-related pirate CD and other factories. This is particularly lightly in
light of the Accord's broader mandates that the administrative agencies, task forces, and
government levels work closely together to end piracy. The fact that agencies like the
National Copyright Agency were previously "impotent" and required local ministers to
enforce their decisions should no longer be an impediment. This is due to the Accord's
205
See supra note 105, 34 I.L.M. at 884. The Agreement Letter states that China will not impose quotas,
import license requirements, or other restrictions on the importation of audio-visual and published products.
206
See supra note 109, art 1(E)(6), 34 I.L.M. at 898-99.
207
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organizing of multi-agency task forces, its requirement that governments "at each level"
aid in the enforcement process,
209
its empowerment of the task forces to impose fines and
end production of violators, and its empowerment of the agencies themselves. Similarly,
customs officers are now authorized to detain and destroy infringing products.
Enforcement, historically, suffered due to the lack of criminal sanctions; the 1995 Accord
improves this situation but only indirectly: it empowers the task forces and customs
agents to impose fines hold and detain infringing products. Since the Accord mandates
various copyright and verification systems, it should become easier to prove that
infringers had "knowledge" of the infringement. Furthermore, this should facilitate the
enforcement of both civil and criminal sanctions for the commercial sale of pirated
products. The Accord also, in a notable improvement for non-Chinese firms, for the
first time gives non-Chinese firm direct access to administrative remedies that were
formerly denied to them.
Beyond these specific and immediate changes, the Accord may improve the long-
term status of intellectual property rights protection in China. For example, the State
Council Working Conference may have a broad, long-term impact by coordinating
919
policies and monitoring the implementation of the existing laws. Similarly, the
Accord's educational programs may create improved awareness for intellectual property
208
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209
210
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See Supplementary Trademark Provisions, Chna Pat. & Trademarks, Apr. 1993, at 91 (outlining
criminal pmalties for counterfeiting trademarks on a commercial scale); Decision fo the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress Concerning Punishment of the Crime of Copyright
Infringement, China Laws for Foreign Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH), P 1-701, at 14,597
(presenting criminal liabilities for copyright pirating).
212 See supra note 109.
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rights protection and enhanced customs enforcement may eliminated a major incentive
for intellectual property pirates.
Yet, three issues remain: first, in the past China has entered into intellectual property
protection agreements, but fail to enforce them; second, the 1995 Accord is basically
silent regarding the ambiguities, lack of definition, fair use exceptions, loopholes, and
similar inadequacies in the laws themselves, so that enforcement, even if pursued, might
well prove slow or futile; third, even six months after the Accord was signed, and
therefore well into its special enforcement period, serous concerns were being raised by
US officials about China's commitment to implementing the Accord.
c. A number of Modifications to the 1995 Accord Are Required
The 1995 Accord will have to be modified if it is to address the remaining
impediments to effective intellectual property protection in China. Since many of these
impediments are rooted in China's laws, the Accord should be modified to require
amending a number of these laws in such a way as to bolster intellectual property rights
protection in China. China's Software Regulations must be amended to provide Berne
Convention protection to computer software. Topographies and trade secrets must
receive protection. China's laws must be amended to provide detailed provisions of
serving notice of claims and for opportunities to review and present all relevant evidence
in a dispute. Ambiguities, loopholes, and inadequate definitions in the laws must be
addressed. Specifically, terms such as "patent infringement," "number of copies," and
"non-commercial purposes," must be clarified. The ability of the courts and agencies to
assign criminal sanctions must be strengthened. Sanctions should be added to the 1995
Accord to ensure that the Accord's enforcement provisions, particularly as they apply to
50
the manufacturers' level, will be applied more aggressively, as well as the Agreement
Letter's pledge to improve market access. Without such modifications, the 1995 Accord
will remain, if not toothless, surely incapable of eliminating some of the most pernicious
impediments to intellectual property protection in China.
F. Service Trade
China's closed market in commercial service is inconsistent with the General
Agreement on Trade in Services.214 At present, foreign service trade providers may only
operate "under selective 'experimental' licenses and are restricted to specific geographic
areas."
215 The rules regulating these experimental licenses are not transparent, which lead
to even more limits on market access by foreigners. Foreign service trade providers
also are not offered the same treatment as are Chinese nationals in that they have less
T 1 "7
freedom to contract with customers than do Chinese entities. Restrictions on foreign
service trade providers have the effect of closing off most of China's market to foreign
competition, at the same time, it is detrimental to the interest of domestic consumers.
Service trade involves many broad areas including finance, insurance,
transportation, tourism, telecommunications, consulting services, and projects under
contracts. The developing nature of China's service trade, combined With China's lack of
experience in international service trade, makes China more cautious in its approach
toward service trade in drafting the Foreign Trade Law of China (FTL)in 1994. Unlike
213
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See Import and Export Controls, supra note 78, P 80-252, at 82, 204 (stating that China has restricted the
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the trade in goods and technologies, in which China sets the principle of free trade, the
FTL commits China to encouraging the development of service trade but falls short of
establishing free trade principles. Under the FTL, China will grant market access and
national treatment only to those parties who have signed or entered into the international
service trade treaties or agreements with China. Beyond those areas, China has adopted
an approach to opening the service sector on a selective and gradual basis.
China's protective approach toward service trade is generally attributed to the
developing and sensitive nature of China's service trade. For a long time, China regarded
the service industry as non-productive. As a result, the Chinese government carried out
an economic policy that stressed the development of the manufacturing industry to the
neglect of the service industry. Not until the 1980s did China begin to implement an
overall reform policy. Despite the service sector's impressive growth and diversification
during the 1980s, China's share of international service trade is still insignificant. As of
1987, China's total share in world export and import of private services was only 0.9%
99
1
and 0.5%, respectively. According to statistics collected by GATT in 1989, of the forty
leading service import and export countries, China ranked twenty-seventh in service
• • • 999
export and thirty-second in service import.
Another factor contributing to China's cautious approach to service trade is a lack
of comprehensive evaluation of China's service industry. While each department
commands a decent knowledge of the service industries within its jurisdiction, there is no
agency that is responsible for collecting the statistics of each service industry and
20
Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, Act of May 12, 1994, 3 China L. for Foreign
Bus. Reg. At 25, 211.
221 The Top Twenty Exporters and Importers, Focus (GATT Newsletter), Apr. 1990, at 4.
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conducting general research to identify the weaknesses and strengths of those service
industries. The lack of such concrete research not only makes it premature for China to
swing open the doors of its service industry, but renders it difficult for China to conduct
efficient service negotiations with other countries.
Furthermore, because the service industry includes such sensitive industries as
banking, insurance, transportation and telecommunications, China shares the concern of
other developing countries that foreign control over these industries might pose a threat
to China's sovereignty and security. For China, control over these industries represents
not only the socialist nature of its economy, but also its economic and political
sovereignty. Although foreign service providers may provide more efficient and
inexpensive service, China will proceed very cautiously because political considerations
are bound to outweigh economic considerations where sovereignty and security are at
stake.
The FTL's protective approach toward service trade does not provide a long-term
solution to the growth of China's service industries, a fact of which China's policy
makers are aware. On the one hand, the reciprocity principle of international trade
requires China to open its service market further if China hopes to enjoy broader access
to other countries' markets. On the other hand, a certain degree of controlled
competitionis helpful to stimulate the development of domestic service industries. The
FTL addresses this issue by providing that China shall encourage the development of
international service trade in steps.
224
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In accordance with this principle, China has selectively opened its service sector to
foreign service trade providers in finance, insurance, law, commerce trade and other
fields. In the financial sector, China has opened thirteen cities to foreign financial
institutions to handle their foreign currency business. Foreign insurance companies are
. ... . 777
allowed to set up offices to conduct liaison activities in China. Through the end of
September 1994, 108 foreign financial institutions, including 100 banks, 4 finance
77R
companies, and 4 insurers, have been approved to operate in China. Currently, four
drafted financial laws have been submitted to the State Council for discussion and
77Q
examination and are expected to come into effect soon. As China's domestic banks
become more competitive, China will open its financial industry further to allow foreign
banks to handle Renminbi business and to allow foreign insurance companies to sell
• 710
insurance to Chinese enterprises and customers. For example, following the Chinese
Ministry of Communications' 1 992 decision permitting foreign shipping companies to set
up wholly foreign -owned or Sino-foreign joint ventures to ship import and export goods,
one foreign company established a subsidiary, and two foreign companies set up
71 1
offices. Foreign firms are also permitted, with some restrictions, to invest in airport
facilities. In professional service, accounting and law are partly open to foreigners, and
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foreign law firms can set up offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and
Haikou.
More significantly, China has been actively involved international service trade
negotiation. As a participant of the Uruguay Round talks, China submitted, in accordance
with the procedures of the talks, an opening price list of initial commitments regarding
service trade and an exchange-reduction opening price list for agricultural and non-
agricultural products. China signed the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) and the Agreement on Agriculture, and proclaimed that, once it is admitted into
GATT, it will accept the obligations formulated at the Uruguay Round.234 It is safe to
predict that with the restoration of China's GATT sear, the pace of opening China's
lie
service trade will be greatly accelerated.
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V. What China should do: Reform efforts in trading system in accordance with
international principles and practices
A. Reforming economic system
From a long-term point of view, the more important solution to making China's
trade regime consistent with international practice is to continue to reform China's
foreign trade regime pursuant to the trade liberalization principle.
1 . The government should avoid falling into the pattern of involving itself in the
micro-contol of foreign trade.
While China should continue to pursue an export development strategy and to
support foreign trade growth by adopting various trade promotion policies, the immediate
attention should be devoted to reducing and eventually phasing out centralized economic
plan, like the mandatory import plan and foreign exchange plan to dismantle the country's
foreign service trade planning apparatus. China should abandon the foreign service trade
contract system, which calls for negotiation of a contract between the central government
and local government, and local government and FTCs; the foreign trade contract system
duplicates many features of the system used to negotiate economic plan, and it directs
FTCs to seek foreign exchange earnings instead of maximizing profits.
When China switch from micro-management of the economy to macro-
management economy, one important task is that China should lift government price
controls on all products.
236 Cheng Hangshen, Guan Yu Zhong Guo Wai Mao Ti Zhi Gai Ge De Jian Yi (Some Proposals to China 's
Foreign Trade Reform), SYSTEM REFORM, May, 1 992, at 20.
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In light of the restraint price distortion imposes on China's foreign trade reform,
price liberalization should be the top priority of future reforms. Price distortion is
responsible for the mandatory import plan, which, in turn, has led to the retention of the
commodity licensing system, quotas, and monopolization of National FTCs; therefore,
removing price controls on all products will create the conditions necessary to eliminate
ill
all the major administrative controls mentioned above. Currently, prices of industrial
and capital-intensive products are higher than prices of the same products in the
international market. Further, prices of primary and labor-intensive products are lower
than prices of the same products in the international market. To correct this distortion,
China will have to take steps to remove price controls on grains, some raw materials, and
services, so as to eliminate the root cause of the price distortions. In addition to
removing price controls, the price-setting mechanism should be improved to let
enterprises become the true price setters.
Another point of changing from micro-control to macro-management is to reform
China's enterprise system to create a modern enterprise system. The focal point of
enterprise reform is to transform the operational mechanism and to raise efficiency. Since
government interference operates as a major obstacle for transforming the enterprise
operational mechanism, the first step of enterprise reform should separate the government
at various levels from the operational functions of the enterprise to allow the enterprises
to make all important business decisions. On the other hand, the government must
guarantee the enterprises the power to make decisions on such issues as capital
construction, important technological improvement, and appointment of general
237
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managers to the enterprises. When conditions permit, more medium and large State-
owned enterprises should be transformed into limited-liability companies and limited-
liability stock companies pursuant to the Company Law.
To facilitate the creation of the modern enterprise system, reforms to establish
social protection systems, such as welfare, unemployment insurance, and social security,
should be accelerated so as to relieve the enterprises of all the undue burdens they now
shoulder. In addition, the residence system should be reformed on a large scale to allow
the free flow of the population to provide the labor forces needed.
241
If the enterprises are
still not able to compete, they should be sent to bankruptcy without any hesitation.
To ensure the success of the enterprises and price reforms, a more rounded system
for macro-control will have to be established in the near future. This will allow the
government to carry out economic management primarily through economic and legal
measures instead of through administrative controls, such as the national economic plan,
State price-setting on important commodities, and State subsidies. What are most
urgently needed are structural reforms in finance, taxation, banking, investment, materials
supply, and foreign exchange to strengthen the overall coordination in the operation and
the management of the economy. Under the macro-control mechanism, the government
will direct the activities of the enterprises mainly through regulating the market.
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2. Despite playing a positive role in bringing about the foreign trade growth, relying
primarily on FTCs to handle Chinese foreign trade insulates domestic producers
and end-users from buyers and sellers in the international market. Thus, the
practice operates as an obstacle to normal commercial relations between Chinese
companies and foreign companies.
Restricting FTCs from engaging in production and restricting production
enterprises from handling foreign trade does not adequately prepare them to respond to
international market changes. China should relax its approval standards for foreign trade
rights so that more production enterprises and scientific research institutions can enter
into foreign trade; this would allow these entities to combine their technological
sophistication with an expertise in international trade. 4 As more enterprises enter the
foreign trade arena, bankruptcy will play its role in eliminating inefficient foreign trade
243
operators.
While industry protection remains necessary considering China's industrial
development level, it is important to protect those industries that urgently need to be
protected and to use internationally accepted means to provide protection. The
overlapping of the administrative controls on some products seems to be redundant and
too complicated; therefore, it is possible to remove some products from multiple
administrative controls.
Furthermore, the current distinction between Category I and Category II (national
FTC and regional FTC) should be abolished and steps should be taken to discontinue the
242 As of the end of 1993, China had authorized approximately 2,000 industrial enterprises to handle foreign
trade. Wu Yi, Lu He Mian Du Yi Chang Mei You Xiao Yan De Shi Jie Shang Zhan (How to face a
Smokeless Commercial War), China Reform, July 1994, at 7.
59
practice of assigning import and export rights to one or a few NFTCs, such as timber,
cement, and fertilizers, as this represents the most effective method of administrative
control over imports. As China's industries become more competitive, and as the need for
protection declines, tariffs and taxes should replace licensing and quotas as the main
means for protection.
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3. Improving transparency and reducing arbitrariness in trade management.
An important goal of reforming China's foreign trade regime is to make the trade
regime more transparent and less arbitrary through comprehensive legislation. By
establishing only general principles governing foreign trade activities, the FTL has left
open several issues for further legislation. The immediate solution is to step up legislation
on the major systems of the trade regime in accordance with the general principles
embodied in the FTL. Without further legislation, a general FTL will be of little help in
reducing arbitrariness in China's foreign trade management. 245
Because the contracting parties have more concerns over lack of transparency and
arbitrariness in the process of foreign trade enterprise approval, commodity licensing, and
quota allocation, the license issuance and quota allocation processes must be more open,
fair, simplified, and efficient.246 Formulating concrete and definitive standards and
providing an appeals process would effectively reduce arbitrariness and mitigate the
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contracting parties' concerns. Revising some of the regulations governing licensing and
quota allocation, and publishing the regulations governing the examination and approval
of foreign trade enterprises, will help to alleviate those concerns.
247
China must restore uniformity in foreign trade policy and policy enforcement to
reduce the uncertainty in trading with the Chinese foreign trade companies located in
different provinces and subject to different ministries. The National People's Congress
should enhance legislative supervision to invalidate local legislation that is inconsistent
with the foreign trade legislation of the country. In addition, MOFTEC should uniformly
enforce China's trade laws and policies. Provinces and ministries should be prohibited
from applying different standards in administering licenses because of local
considerations.
Moreover, efforts should be made to adopt internationally accepted foreign trade
practices. China should publish anti-dumping regulations, anti-subsidy regulations, and
regulations on safeguard measures in the near future to shield domestic industries from
unfair competition form foreign competitors. At the same time, China should publish
regulations governing the behavior of import and export enterprise and competition
between Chinese foreign trade enterprises.
B. Reducing tariffs and phasing out non-tariff barriers
1. Improving laws and tariff schedules in order to make the international trade
administration more transparent.
247
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Transparency in trade regulations is a bedrock principle of the GATT, articulated
in Article X; furthermore, centrally planned economies must report state trading
activities. The Uruguay Round negotiations that created the WTO sought to expand the
reporting of tariff and nontariff duties and charges. Aware of these requirements, China
has been touting its trade reforms as attempts to comply with GATT's mandate. Its new
foreign trade law, geared to GATT/WTO provisions but still far from complete
compliance, has been in force only a few years. Formerly neibu (internal) documents
describing China's foreign trade regime were made public to the GATT/WTO Secretariat
in the early 1 990s; English and other foreign language translations have been promised.
2. Reducing general level of tariffs rates in a progressive course.
China has made firm commitments to lower tariffs within a reasonable period of
time. In March 1994, China submitted to the GATT a proposal for tariff reduction, which
committed it to maintain a ceiling of a forty percent tariff rate on industrial products. This
rate would be reduced further to 35 percent by 1999 and to 30 percent
within five years of China's entry of WTO. 249In fact, these objectives have been
substantially achieved through the reduction of average tariff to 23 percent on April 1 st,
1996.
3. Government should make the best effort possible under current circumstances to
reduce non-tariff barriers.
As for the use of one of the non-tariff barriers, import and export quotas, except
for reducing the import quotas, China should publish the rules for export quota bidding
and conducted public bidding for all agricultural products subject to export quotas.
249 Guiguo Wang, Economic Integration in Quest ofLaw-The Chinese Experience, 29 J. WORLD TRADE
5 (1995), at 8-9.
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China has committed to the gradual elimination of import quotas and licenses and
to the reduction of quantitative restrictions on imports form the current 1,247 tariff
categories to 240 by the year 2000.250
4. China should reduce the number of goods subject to import licensing and
simplifying the procedure for applying licenses, now, it's impossible to eradicate all the
licenses, but China should be committed to eliminate licensing step by step.
C. Strengthening legalization for the trading system.
1 . Improving the current foreign trade law of 1 994 (FTL 1 994).
First, let's review the Foreign Trade Law of 1994, so that we would know how to
improve it.
Before 1994, no national legislation on foreign trade was ever made in China which
was applicable throughout the country. The Chinese government relied solely on
administrative regulations and directives to exert total control over foreign trade. Most of
these administrative regulations and directives were never openly published and made
known to the outside world. For one and a half decades after the beginning of foreign
trade reform in 1979, the legal framework was based on half a dozen administrative
regulations.
231
This practice directly conflicted with international norms and GATT
practices that favor published laws over discrete administrative regulations. Before long,
the void of national legislation which created lack of unity and transparency in China's
foreign trade legal framework caused widespread concerns in China's trading partners
and become a major obstacle to China's accession to the GATT. To dispel this concern,
250
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the Chinese government accelerated the pace to enact a foreign trade law with the advent
of the 1990s.
May 12, 1994 marked a watershed occasion in China's foreign trade law reform.
That day, the Standing Committee of the 8 th National People's Congress passed the first
comprehensive foreign legislation in modern Chinese history, the Foreign Trade Law of
the People's Republic of China (FTL). With the FTL coming into effect the following
July 1, China's foreign trade legal regime finally took shape, after more than fifteen years
of continuous reform and the promulgation of hundreds of laws and regulations
OCT
governing various aspects of foreign economic relations. More than anything else, the
FTL symbolizes the legalization of China's foreign trade legal regime.
The drafters of the FTL followed three proclaimed principles in drafting this
legislation. All of them bear clear indications of the molding influence of GATT
principles and practices:
First, China's foreign trade policies and regulations must conform to the basic
principles laid out in the FTL and must be openly published and freely available. Second,
bans or restrictions on imports and exports must conform to GATT rules and must be
transparent. Third, domestic industries must be protected through legal proceeding
against unfair imports and not by administrative measures.253
Licensing System for Imported Goods; and the Detailed Implementing Rules for the Interim Regulations of
the People's Republic of China on the Licensing System for Imported Goods.
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According to one estimate, between 1979 and 1986, China enacted over 300 economic laws and
regulations, half of which were related to foreign economic relations.
Bing Wang, China 's New Foreign Trade Law: Analysis and Implicationsfor China 's GATT Bid, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. Rev. 495, at 521. This article is a thorough and penetrating analysis of the 1994 Foreign
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For the first time in China's foreign trade legal history, the FTL established
comprehensive and legally defined principles for China's foreign trade policies and
practice. At the outset, it underscores the fundamental principle established in the 1993
amendment to the Constitution and declares that the promotion of a "socialist market
iff
economy"is the ultimate goal for China's foreign trade. Next, it defines the term
"foreign trade" as including "import and export of goods, import and export of
if/:
technology, and international service trade." Confirming China's readiness to assume
all obligations under such international treaties and organizations as GATT and WTO,
Article 6 states.
With respect to foreign trade, the People's Republic of China shall, in accordance
with international treaties or agreements, which it has concluded or is a participant in, or
based on the principles of reciprocity and equity, grant other signatories or participants
the most favored nation status and national treatment.
Based on these general principles, the FTL emphatically addresses the issues of
unified national trade policy, transparency, and conformity with GATT principles and
international practices with respect to NTBs, market access, anti-dumping, subsidies, and
safeguard measures.
China's foreign trade reform started with the decentralization of foreign trade
management. Prior to 1979, all major trade decisions were made by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade (MOFT) under the central government, and all foreign trade transactions
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were carried out by a dozen Foreign Trade Companies under MOFT's direct control.
Between 1979 and 1987, China decentralized its foreign trade management by granting
foreign trade rights to other ministries of the central government besides MOFT,
provinces and municipalities, and a growing number of production enterprises.
By the mid-1980s, several hundred foreign trade companies were established as
production enterprises under the auspices of various ministries of the central government,
provinces, and municipalities. In 1987, their number reached 1,500 and increased to
5,000 by 1990.260 As of 1994, China's foreign trade was run by 9,000 foreign trade
companies, manufacturing enterprises, scientific research institutes, and industrial trade
companies, as well as 190,000 foreign-funded enterprises engaged in foreign trade
operation. These newly created NFTCs and other organizations with foreign trade
authorization acquired the right to handle all export commodities, except for sixteen
kinds of important exports commodities which are still centralized under the National
Foreign Trade Company.
Decentralization injected energy and economic incentives into China's foreign
trade system. It served as the major driving force responsible for the phenomenal growth
of China's foreign trade in recent years. However, the benefits of decentralization had not
been achieved without accompanying problems, of which the most prominent was the
lack of unity and consistency in trade policy implementation throughout the country and
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loss of supervisory control by the central government. Local authorities and various
ministries under the central government often made regulations and rules that were
inconsistent with the national policies. They gave different, sometimes conflicting,
interpretations to the national laws and regulations. As a result, national foreign trade
policies and regulations were not uniformly enforced, which not only caused confusion
among China's trading partners but also concern of the GATT contracting parties.
To remedy this problem of lack of unity, the FTL specifically affirms that "The
state shall implement a unified foreign trade system in order to safeguard according to
law a fair and free trade order." 64 It vests "the department in charge of foreign trade and
economic cooperations under the State Council" (presently MOFTEC) with the sole
power to direct "foreign trade matters throughout China in accordance with this Law."26:>
While the FTL brings back unity into China's foreign trade management, it does not
restore the highly centralized structure, which characterized the pre-reform foreign trade
system. Instead, it strikes a balance between unity of policy and decentralization of
operation in foreign trade by defining the role ofMOFTEC as one of macro-management
in setting up broad policies, developing general goals, and supervising the
implementation of laws and regulations. Under the FTL, this macro-management is to be
exercised through the promulgation and implementation of laws and regulations, and
increasingly, through economic means such as tariffs, interest rates, exchange rates, and
loans.
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As a distinctive feature of a planned economy, lack of transparency was
preeminent in China's pre-reform foreign trade regime, which naturally aroused concern
by the GATT contracting parties over the incompatibility of China's trade regime with
the international practice of transparency in foreign trade policies. In particular, the
contracting parties voiced displeasure over China's pervasive use of internal directives,
commonly referred to as "internal documents," which were available only to a very
limited number of government officials involved in foreign trade. Under this practice,
"the annual imports and exports plan was classified as top 'business secrets' of the
state.
Since the early 1980s, China has taken steps to improve the transparency of its
foreign trade regime. The promulgation of laws and regulations, especially the FTL itself,
has gradually yet decisively moved its foreign trade regime away from total
administrative control. In response to the GATT contracting parties' requests to halt the
use of "internal documents," China published a significant number of previously
unavailable decrees, rules, and regulations. It also made further commitments not to
enforce any law, rule, regulation, administrative guidance, or policy measure governing
trade unless it was published.
The FTL's enactment represents a major step toward greater transparency. It sets up
a uniform legal framework for foreign trade that can be followed by foreign trade
partners. It clearly defines MOFTEC's jurisdiction, authority, and relation to other
governmental agencies involved in foreign trade activities, and thus makes it much easier
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for foreign trade partners to conduct their business within the jurisdiction of these
270
agencies.
With respect to those major issues in international trade such as NTBs, market
access, government subsidies, anti-dumping, and safeguards, the FTL closely follows the
practices prescribed in the GATT charter and other documents. Without entirely
eliminating all kinds of NTBs in China's foreign trade system, the FTL nevertheless has
made the best effort possible under current circumstances to reduce NTBs. The most
striking progress occurred with regard to the foreign trade planning practice.
For more than thirty years, foreign trade planning had been the most effective non-
tariff device employed by the central government to exert total control on foreign trade. It
sets the figures for the import and export of each product, the source of import and
export, and the allocation of foreign exchange. Once the plan is in place, the State will
allocate foreign exchange responsibilities to NFTCs to enable them to import the
products covered under the import plan and to cover the losses suffered by NFTCs in
carrying out the export plan. The trade-restrictive effect of foreign trade planning is that it
prevents the market forces from playing a role in directing imports and exports.
During the 1980s, China gradually reduced the role of foreign trade planning. In
addition to the outright abandonment of the mandatory export plan, the mandatory import
plan, which constituted 40 percent of China's imports in 1986, was reduced to cover only
18.5 percent of all imports in 1992. Reflecting its drafters' determination to eventually
abolish all mandatory foreign trade plans, the FTL is conspicuously silent on foreign
269 Edward Balls, Survey ofChina, FIN. TIMES, November 18, 1993, at 7; China to Make Trade
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270
See supra note 121, at 524.
271
See supra note 74, at 24-26.
69
trade planning in its text—a clear indication that it perceives no place for foreign trade
77-5
planning within the new foreign trade regime.
In dealing with another NTB, the licensing system, the FTL adopts a pragmatic
approach. On the one hand, the drafters of the FTL realize the impossibility at this time of
eradicating this practice. Thus, the FTL retains the licensing system for the import and
export of selected commodities and technologies.274 On the other hand, China treats
licensing as a temporary necessity to maintain continuity in its foreign trade practice, not
as a central piece of administrative control, and indicates its determination to eliminate
licensing in phases.
Although the FTL falls shy of abolishing the use of quotas in foreign trade, it
requires the publication of the list of commodities under quotas and the identification of
the government department in charge of making the list, thus introducing transparency
and market mechanism into the administration of quotas distribution. It is significant that,
following the enactment of the FTL, China published the rule for export quota bidding
and conducted public bidding for four agricultural products subject to export quotas.
In prescribing the measures dealing with trade surge, dumping, and subsidies, the
FTL directly borrows the solutions provided by GATT. Articles 29 (on safeguards), 30
(on dumping), and 31 (on subsides) of the FTL parallel the language used in Articles XIX
(escape clause), VI (anti-dumping), and XVI (subsidies) of GATT.278 This shows that the
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FTL resembles the GATT charter almost verbatim and draws China's foreign trade legal
regime even closer to the international practice.
2. Chinese domestic industries must be protected through legal proceeding against
unfair imports and not by administrative measures.
From a long-term point of view, the more important solution to making China's
trade regime consistent with international practice is to continue to reform China's
foreign trade regime pursuant to the trade liberalization principle. Foremost, while the
State will continue to pursue an export development strategy and to support foreign trade
growth by adopting various trade promotion policies, the government should avoid
falling into the pattern of involving itself in the administrative management of foreign
trade. The immediate attention should be devoted to reducing and eventually phasing out
the mandatory import plan and foreign exchange plan to dismantle the country's foreign
trade planning apparatus. China should abandon the foreign trade contract system, which
calls for negotiation of a contract between the central government and local government,
and local government and foreign trade companies; the foreign trade contract system
duplicates many features of the system used to negotiate economic plans, and it directs
foreign trade companies to seek foreign exchange earnings instead of maximizing
profits.
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D. Strengthening the protection for intellectual property
China has taken substantial steps since signing the 1995 Accord. It has closed
factories, seized counterfeit goods, and provided more market access to foreign
companies. Restrictions on the import of materials and equipment required in the
279 Cheng Hangshen, Guan Yu Zhong Guo Wai Mao Ti Zhi Gai Ge De Jian Yi (Some Proposals to China's
Foreign Trade Reform), SYSTEM Reform, May, 1992, at 20.
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manufacture of CDs may help to ensure that new factories do not spring up to replace the
ones the government has closed down. The steps taken prior to the 1 996 Agreement are
promising, but China's intellectual property right enforcement system must become self-
sufficient before it deserves praise. Only if China continues to protect intellectual
property without the threat of sanctions may it be said that China affords internationally
acceptable protection of intellectual property rights.
1 . China should stiffen legislation actions and improve enforcement measures.
China has pledged to carry out its obligations under the 1995 Intellectual Property
Accord. China has promised to revise the title verification system used to ensure that
Chinese CD factories and publishing houses have properly licensed the titles they wish to
produce. Two other important monitoring programs involve SID codes ad on-site
inspections.
Additionally, a group of Chinese officials responsible for the effective
enforcement for Intellectual Property Right in China visited the Seattle area and Silicon
Valley this summer to meet with officials form Microsoft and other high-technology
businesses. The Chinese officials came to the United States to observe how it enforces
copyright law. Plans were made for US officials to provide on-site assistance in China at
some date.
Market access has improved greatly for US producers of intellectual property. In
the summer of 1996, Warner Home Video and MGM/UA Home Entertainment
announced that they had "entered into a licensing agreement with Shenzhen Advanced
Science Enterprise Group..., one of China's largest manufacturers and distributors of
72
VCD and LD hardware and software.280 Software giant Microsoft stated that it expects
sales in China to double in 1996 as a result of increase purchases of legal software.
2. China should bring its laws in line with international standards.
The 1995 Accord fails to address many of the impediments that continue to
hamper intellectual property protection in China. Consequently, while the Accord is a
significant step forward for intellectual property protection in China, it will not, in its
current form, move China into compliance with the international standards embodied in
China, it will not, in its current form, move China into compliance with the international
standards embodied in TRIPs. The Accord, therefore, should be revisited and modified to
address the impediments to China's effective intellectual property protection. Without
such modifications, and without China's faithful implementation of its agreements, China
will not be able to bring its intellectual property protection up to international standards.
3. China should liberalize the regulations for foreign lawyer to practice and provide
legal service in China and allow foreign impeded owner of intellectual property to appeal
alleged domestic infringers in Chinese court.
a The demand for foreign lawyer's service to China's development, especially for
the development of intellectual property rights law.
The continued expansion of world trade has created a growing need for
international legal services. Lawyers from all nations are increasingly traveling and
settling in foreign countries to meet this need. Foreign lawyers facilitate international
transactions, expand the flow of goods and increase trade in other types of services,
280 Warner Home Video andMGM/UA Entertainment to License in China; First Major Video Companies to
Distribute in Chinese Market, Bus. WIRE, July 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, CURNWS File.
281
Peter Hannam, Microsoft's China Sales Expected to Double (last modified Sept. 16, 1996).
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"particularly in such sectors as financial servicesa and intellectual property rights which
are especially law-intensive." More concretely, foreign lawyers' practice usually
consists of advising clients on international commercial matters. This includes advising
on international finance, intellectual property rights, tax planning, corporate and
securities law, franchising, licensing, distribution and commercial agency, joint ventures,
competition law, arbitration and general international law. In most cases, foreign lawyers
have at least the same amount of specialized training as local lawyers. In fact, foreign
lawyers, especially those form advanced developed countries, are more likely to be
qualified than local lawyers to advise clients on China and international law because of
their experience and international contacts.
Foreign lawyers usually provide their services in one of two contexts in China.
First, Chinese law firms hire and "import" foreign lawyers to their home office to advise
domestic clients on the law of the foreign lawyers' home country. More commonly,
foreign law firms send their own lawyers to China to establish or staff a Chinese branch
office.
b. Three major reasons that China restricts foreign lawyers' practice in China and
proposals to solve these concerns.
(1). Proof of Qualifications
The reason cited to disallow a scope of practice to foreign attorneys in China is
that foreign lawyers lack qualification to practice in China, because there are often
inherent cultural and philosophical difference between legal systems, for example, the
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In New York, for example, there are layers from at least 45 different countries, "from Argentina to
Uruguay." Hope B. Engel, New York's Rules on Licensing ofForeign Legal Consultants, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J.
36 (Mar/Apr 1994).
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common and civil law systems, that make the foreign lawyer's credentials incompatible
with the local legal system regardless of the quality of standards in the home nation.
These concerns, however, need not lead to the extreme conclusion that foreign
lawyers should be required to obtain the same legal training and certification in China as
any local Chinese lawyers. Limiting the foreign lawyer to practice only in matters related
to the law of his home jurisdiction, where he or she is already qualified, minimizes the
risk of harm to the public caused by defects in the training or competency of the foreign
lawyer. Underlying this suggestion is the premise that some reliance on the home
jurisdiction's certification process is warranted. When the foreign lawyer is delivering
services based only on his own law, especially about protection of the intellectual
property rights of his own country's products, a rule requiring him to be reeducated in the
schools of China is both overly severe and pointless.
Hong Kong, the former British colony and now a Special Administrative Zone of
China, offers a unique and more rational approach for insuring that the foreign lawyer is
qualified and provides a model for the rest of China to follow. Hong Kong licenses not by
inducidual attorney, but by law firm. The primary requirement is that the firm present
satisfactory evidence that it is a "long established partnership with a substantial
reputation in the country of origin." The Hong Kong approach rests on the reasonable
28
American Bar Association, Section ofInternationl Law and Practice, Report to the House ofDelegates:
Model Rulefor the Licensing ofLegal Consultants, 28 INT'L LAW. 207, 216 (1994).
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For example, it is often said that the Japanese system favors conciliation, while the American system is
adversarial. See Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, Law IN JAPAN 41-73 (A. Von
Mehrened. 1963).
85 Law Society of Hong Kong, Foreign Law Firms Establishing Themselves in Hong Kong-Guidelines to
Applicants (Sept. 1, 1975) The provision states, in this context: (i) Long established would mean that the
firmcan satisfy the committee that it has an established and continuous practice in the country fo origin for
a substantial period, (ii) A substantial reputation means that the applicant frim can produce references from
its local Law Society or local Bar or equivalent, from Judges and other frims of attorneys in its country of
origin that it is a partnership of reputable lawyers who have conducted themselves in accordance with the
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presumption that inherent in the practice of the modern foreign legal adviser are qualities
that lessen the danger of incompetent counsel. For example, although there are
exceptions, most clients of American law firms abroad are local law firms and
corporations, many of which have their own staff counsel. Presumptively, this type of
client is legally sophisticated and not likely to consult or be deceived by a foreign
attorney who is merely feigning knowledge of the law. In addition, established law firms
abroad, which account for the vast majority of American lawyer's foreign presence,
generally attract and hire only the most capable American law school graduates. Given
these factors, Hong Kong's approach, which allows only reputable law firms to practice,
is an acceptable model to China.
Right now, China has allow foreign law firm to open and register in some big and
open cities of China, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, more
and more foreign firms would come to China in the near future.
(2). The fear of encroachment
China government has expressed fear of encroachment on and disruption of the
domestic legal profession by foreigners. Chinese lawyers have claimed that once the
floodgates are opened, the country will be deluged with foreign law firms and lawyers
who will in turn disrupt the development of the legal system and take business away from
local lawyers and other professionals.
Actually, restrictions designed only to protect local lawyers adversely affect the
client. In a restricted market, legal services are harder to obtain, the cost of services goes
moral and ehical requirements of the profession in that area and against whom no disciplinary or
disbarment proceedings are outstanding.
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Since only well-established US firms can afford to set up a foreign law office, presumably they will
strive to uphold their reputation of quality services in order to compete favorably in the marketplace. Cf.
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up, and business opportunities may be lost, especially to today's China, who's economic
development majorly depends on foreign investment and exportation. The experience of
England and other countries, as well as a recent empirical study conducted in the United
States,
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strongly indicates that fears of foreign lawyers doing harm to the bar and the
public are not well founded. Most importantly, examination of the experience of
nations that have allowed foreign lawyers to practice suggests strongly that the presence
of foreign lawyers not only poses no risk of harm, but actually benefits local lawyers.
Experiences has shown in England that when foreign lawyers are organized to give an
efficient business service to their clients, they present not a threat to the profession but
the best form of competition, and, in fact, they introduce new international business for
English lawyers.
At this respect, Hong Kong can be the model of China, too. Hong Kong has
adopted approach for regulating the number and activities of foreign firms, but by
allowing at least two firms from every nation to establish a local practice it appears to
have adopted a presumption that the presence of foreign attorneys benefits the public and
the bar. All firms applying for approval bear a burden of showing that there is a
demand in Hong Kong for the "particular field of specialization" that the firm offers and
that the services of the firm will be available not only to the public, but to Hong Kong
solicitors. The Law Society's guidelines further state that, " unless there is evidence of a
very substantial demand for such advice form the public, the Law Society will not grant
Note 5 Foreign Branches. See also Levy, The American Lawyer in Paris, 52 N.Y.ST.B.A.J. 647 (1980) (One
incentive large firms use to attract top law school graduates is a foreign office).
8
See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.L.REV. 1, 3 (1981)
88
Id. The results of the study show that the complaints do not come form the public, but from lawyers, id.
At 44, that there is in fact a very low incidence of harm to the public, id. At 34, and that there is no ac tual
economic threat to lawyers.
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permission for additional law firms above the two allotted. Significantly, the Hong Kong
Law Society recently approved three additional American law firms, a fact that strongly
suggests the existence of "substantial demand" and benefit to the local clients and
solicitors.
Another reason to overcome the fear of encroachment is reliance on market forces.
Since controls limiting foreign lawyers' scope of activity and insuring that foreign
lawyers are properly qualified and disciplined protect the most vital aspects of the local
lawyers' monopoly and put foreign lawyers on the same competitive footing as the local
bar, economic forces underlying the legal services marketplace provide adequate
assurances against disruption of the local legal profession. Setting up an office abroad is
an expensive proposition which only a few well-established law firms can undertake.
Moreover, individual lawyers will likely find few opportunities outside of corporations,
in which practice is already widely allowed,290 or local law firms, in which the decision
7Q 1
to hire will be made by local lawyers. Finally, if any such arrangement proves
unproductive, means are available to procure the foreigners' withdrawal.
(3) Safeguard for the Client.
Like other countries, China has an interest in protecting the public from actual
losses caused by malpractice. Misconduct by lawyers and unredressed injury to clients
affect not only the individual client, but also the credibility of the nation's system of
289
See supra note 278.
290
The privilege of corporations abroad to have their own in-house counsel is grounded in part in the
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, which were signed between the United States and its
allies in the 1950's.
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These local firms also have, of course, the power to lay-off or refuse to hire American attorneys if there
is no client demand for their services or if the arrangement does not prove to be beneficial to the firm.
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It is standard procedure for host nations to obtain assurances, in the form of proof of cash reserves,
return airline tickets or the like, that all visitors have the monetary means and the obligation to return to
their respective countries.
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justice. When foreign lawyers are involved, China's concern is that the sanctions, which
control the local lawyers are not effective against the foreign practitioner. The foreign
lawyer may leave the country and thus remove himself from the jurisdiction of the local
courts. He may have no attachable property with which to assure a judgment. In addition,
the foreign lawyer cooperating "outside" the system is also outside the ambit of the local
code of disciplinary and administrative sanctions that compel adherence to local
standards of conduct.
These concerns, all of which are valid, justify a high degree of restriction on
foreign lawyers. However, it is possible to develop an approach that mitigates these
concerns without putting unnecessarily broad restrictions on the practice of law by
foreigners.
For example, the breadth of the restrictions should reflect two countervailing
factors. First, many foreign firms have long-term interests and property in the host
country. Once a foreign firm is established, it can be expected to protect its interests by
maintaining high standards of conduct, like Hong Kong, which institutionalizes this
factor by requiring law firm applicants to demonstrate their reputation, and then requiring
the firm to undertake responsibility for the individuals in the firm. The undertaking given
by the firms to the Law Society will include a specific provision that where any breach of
the undertaking or codes of professional conduct is alleged the foreign firm and/or its
local partner or assistant as may be appropriate will submit to the jurisdiction of a
disciplinary committee in the same was [sic], as if they were a firm of solicitors, admitted
to practise in Hong Kong. Such disciplinary committee will have power to require the
firm to discontinue it practice or to discontinue the employment in Hong Kong of any
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partner or assistant for any serious breach of the undertakings given to the Law Society.
Second, in the case of an individual lawyer who is employed by a local firm or a lawyer
who is only in the country on a temporary basis, there are means available to compel
responsible behavior and protect clients' interests.
Various security devices provide an effective safeguard to alleviate risk of harm to
client. For example, Chinese jurisdictions should require an agent to be named to accept
service of process. In addition, the foreign lawyer might be required to provide
malpractice insurance coverage. Similarly, when the foreign lawyer handles clients'
assets, the state could require him to file a security bond.294 Finally, requiring the foreign
lawyer to demonstrate his "good moral character" might also serve to reduce risks of
client injury.295 Another possible approach is to weigh the relevant considerations on a
case-by-case basis. Suppose, for example, that the client or other local citizens have had
successful prior dealings with the foreign lawyer or his firm. The nation might choose to
require proof, procured in his home jurisdiction, that his firm is reputable; or it might
require the foreign lawyer to produce letters of recommendation or procure a surety from
highly respected members of the local community in addition to or in lieu of other
security.
£. Facilitating the development of services in trade.
1 . Opening the service market is helpful to stimulate the development of domestic
service industries. Such as post and telecommunications, banking and insurance.
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See Cone, Foreign Lawyers in France andNew York, INT'L LAW, 465, 465-66 (1975) (discussing the
provisions of the French lawyers law, Law No. 71-1 130, 1971 J.CO.
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Id
95 Most nations have a requirement of "goof moral character." There is no general formulation, however,
for example, Denmark requires merely that two non-family members write a letter to the effect that the
applicant is of good moral character. France requires a council juridique to 'not have committed acts
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China already has plans to further open its service trade sector to foreign
companies, including financial and insurance services, the retail sector, foreign trade,
travel services, and telecommunications, but the opening will be on a gradual basis.
US officials in Beijing said that China's Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation Liu Xiangdong announced the opening in a recent speech at an
investment and trade fair, but that he provided no timetables. They said it's believed
some sectors will be opened sooner and wider, while it will take longer in others.
a. Financial and Insurance Services.
So far, 173 foreign financial institutions and insurance companies have been
licensed to operate in China. Most of them are confined to Shanghai and Guangdong
Province. Liu said that further market access for foreign financial institutions will depend
on development of necessary legislation and improvements in supervision and
management.
b. Retail Sector
Liu said that China has gained experience in the retail sector from its
experiments with China-foreign retailing joint ventures in over a dozen cities during the
past several years. Now the government is ready to allow foreign retailers to form joint
ventures with local retailers in major cities in all provinces, autonomous regions and
cities that have provincial status.
c. Foreign Trade
arbitrary to honor, honesty or good morals leading either to a penal conviction or to disciplinary or
administrative sanctions or disbarment.
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China will allow foreign companies to set up foreign trade joint ventures with local
firms in major cities of economically developed inland provinces, following the success
of experiments in Shanghai's Pudong Area and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
d. Travel Services
China-foreign joint travel agencies will be allowed in major tourist cities on an
experimental basis.
e. Telecommunications
China will open its telecommunications service market to international companies
after legislation on this sector is improved. Once access is allowed, it will, as usual, be on
an experimental basis at first.
In negotiations on its accession to the World Trade Organization, China has come
under increasing pressure from the leading industrial countries to open its service sector.
US officials said that the message of Mr. Liu' speech is that China is willing to make the
commitment to open its service sector to foreign service providers, but they will have to
be patient.
2. A certain degree of foreign control over these industries would not pose a
threat to China's sovereignty and security.
3. Information technologies, telecommunication and financial services would be
the key industries in the next century.
VI. What the WTO should do: establishing a new middle category for emerging
economies such as China
A. The current disputes between China and the United States
Although China faces many hurdles in its effort to gain admission to the WTO,
one of the most important is the continuing controversy over China's status as a
developed or developing country. China submitted an application to become a
founding member of the WTO on January 1, 1995, but only as a developing country.
The United States and other western industrialized countries prevented China from
becoming a member at that time, chiefly because these countries disputed the claim
that China qualified as a developing country.299 The United States has been adamant that
China enter the WTO as a developed country because if China were to enter the WTO as
296 See China Researchers Dispute US Denial ofContainment Policy (China Radio International broadcast,
Aug. 5, 1995), available in Lexis-Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. Another major stumbling block is human
rights. See id. While the United States has attempted to use trade negotiations as a lever to improve the
human rights situation in China, China claims that such pressure constitutes unjustifiable meddling in its
internal affairs. See How US, Japan Can Help Integrate China into the World Community, STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), Nov. 20, 1996, at 34, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnse File (reporting text of Senior
Minister Lee Kuanyew of Singapore's speech at the Create 21 Asahi Symposium in Osaka, Japan) (noting
that China "resents and resists [the US's attempts to make China more democratic] as an interference in its
domestic matters"). However, a discussion ofhuman rights issues is outside the scope of this Note.
297 See Jeffrey Parker, China Vows Not to Begfor Trade-Club Membership, THE REUTER EUR. BUS. REP.,
Sept. 21, 1995, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Reuters File. China claims to be a "developing"country.
298 See id.
99 See id.; Testimony of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky Before the Subcomm. On Trade of the House
Ways and Means Comm., Fed. Document Clearing House, Sept. 19, 1996 WL 10831 126. The United
States, through the GATT Working Party on China's accession, has isolated five major issues that China
must address before it can be admitted to the GATT. See id. In arguing against the categorization of China
as a "developing country."Peter D. Sutherland, Director-General of the GATT, put special emphasis on the
fact that China moved from 3
1
st
in the world in merchandise trade, in 1980, to 1
1
th
place in the space of
thirteen years, accounting for 3% of all world merchandise trade. See Global Multilateral Trading System:
The Role of the PRC, GATT Doc. 1633, at 4 (May 11, 1994). Sutherland also pointed out that there are still
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a developing country, it would be allowed to maintain most of the market-restricting and
protectionist barriers that currently limit the ability of foreign companies to export their
goods to China.300
While leaders in the United States have called China a developed country,
numerous important political leaders and institutions within China have stated
unequivocally that China will not join the WTO unless it is admitted as a developing
country. Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Wu Yi has said that China is willing to
negotiate and compromise in the issues regarding the alignment of China's economy with
international standards, but China will not compromise on its demand to come into the
WTO as a developing nation.301 Chinese state radio has commented that the United
States' position places "excessive and unrealistic demands, which have led to the failure
of China's GATT membership negotiations at the end of last year." ' The Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation has claimed that "the main
obstacle to China's reentry into GATT is the excessive demands raise by a few countries
TAT
which exceed the level of China's economic development."
numerous obstacles to China's admission, including the lack of transparency of China's market, the role of
state-trading enterprises and the uniform administration of their trade regime.
300 See 1996 National Trade Estimate: China, People's Republic of (visited Mar. 7, 1997).
301
See supra note 148. Wu stated that "[w]e must adhere to our principle and will not beg anybody and will
never sell out our principles." Id. Wu blames the failure of negotiations thus far on the United States'
placing "excessive demands... on China.".
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Taiwan, USA, Trade Issues, New China News Agency Domestic Survey, July 3 1 , 1995, available in
Lexis-Nexis Library, BBCSWB File; see also WTO Admission, Zhongguo Tongxun She News Agency,
July 28, 1995; Talks Resumed in Geneva on China Rejoining GATT, New China News Agency, May 11,
1995, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, BBC SWB File (stating that China is taking a strong stance on its
re-entry to GATT, and is requesting a realistic approach by major contracting parties). Other Chinese
officials have also emphasized the importance of China's status as a developing country and criticized the
American stance. See e.g., US and Chinese Presidents to Continue "Strategic" Dialogues, Look to Future,
Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 25, 1996, available in Lexis-Nexis library, BBCSWB File (noting that
President Jiang Zemin recently referred to China as "the world's largest developing country").
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The United States continues to use its power in the WTO to block China's
admission to the WTO; its position is hat because China is one of the world's biggest
trading nations, it should be considered a developed economy.
304
Mickey Kantor, former
US Trade Representative, argues that, "we all agree that for certain purposes, China, of
course, is a developed country." One American trade official noted that, "overall, as a
trade regime, we are dealing with an enormously important, enormously large, powerful
1A/:
player." The United States does not want to give China an economic advantage by
allowing it to enter the WTO as a developing country. To do so would allow Chinese
companies to conform to less rigorous standards than American companies in similar
areas, making it far more difficult for American businesses to succeed in China.
Both the United States and China seemed inflexible in their demands until
recently, when relations between China and the United States generally have improved.
President Clinton has softened the rhetoric of his first campaign and early years in the
White House about China.30 } This softened rhetoric includes a less harsh stance in the
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306
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See Chinese Foreign Minister Holds News Conference on APEC, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 25,
1996, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. As a result of a meeting between President Clinton
and President Jiang Zemin at the APEC Summit, the two countries agreed to the following: 1) to have two
official state visits by both heads of state in 1997 and 1998; 2) to speed up negotiations on China's
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United States' position against China's admission to the WTO. l It is not clear, however,
how far the United States will go. At a minimum, President Clinton has stated that the
United States will not support China's bid to join the WTO until it does more to open its
markets.
311 Opening markets, however, does not necessarily mean that China must meet
the same standards as would be required of a fully developed country.
In response to changes in the United States' position, China has been sending
mixed signals as to how willing it will be to open its market to foreign trade. At the
APEC summit, President Jiang Zemin expressed a desire to be flexible in addressing
China's admission to the WTO.314 He highlighted China's recent reduction in import
regional concerns and nuclear proliferation. See id.; see also Pragmatic and Proper Line in US Relations
with China; Clinton Gives Trade and Long-Term Influence Policy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at B6
(noting that human rights issues are now behind trade and security issues on the United States' agenda with
China).
310 See Edward Luce & Guy de Jonquie'res, Confusion Greets Clinton 's Big Deal, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1996, at 6. President Clinton told President Jiang Zemin that the US would be "flexible and pragmatic" in
the WTO negotiations provided that China pledged to open its markets further and embrace WTO rules.
See id. Senator Sam Nunn has argued that "[t]he United States should seek to work constructively with
China to facilitate its entry... into the international regimes that regulate and order world affairs." Sam
Nunn & Michael Oksenberg, The US Needs China—and Vice Versa, Newsday, Nov. 26, 1996, at A33.
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tariff rates from an average of 35.9% to an average of 23%, and committed China to a
reduction to an average of 15% by year 2000. He indicated a desire to accelerate the
negotiation process.
316
Other sources indicate that China also may be willing to agree to
make a "down payment" on its WTO application by accepting some of the stricter
commitments required for developed countries by the WTO immediately, and phasing in
TIT
others over time.
The net result of these latest developments is that the United States still will not
allow China to join the WTO unless an agreement regarding its admission contains
"commercially meaningful terms." China continues to resist any limit on its ability to
T1Q
use extra safeguards to secure sufficient protection for its domestic industries. Reading
between the lines, there does seem an ability to craft a compromise based upon the above
ECON. Newswire, Nov. 21, 1996, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File. This leaves the United
States as the principle roadblock in the path toward China's admission to the WTO.
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available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File (statement of European Commission Vice President, Sir
Leon Brittan). Brittan believes that China may be moving toward accepting the compromise supported by
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terms, one that does not involve the prior rigid formulation of both parties: that is, one
that does not require China to be treated as either an entirely developed or entirely
developing country.
Part of the difficulty in predicting the future of these negotiations is the fact that
China and United States face divergent domestic pressures. In the United States,
businesses involved in exporting products would like greater access to the Chinese
market and its more than one billion potential consumers. On the other hand, US
industries that sell in the domestic market fear that Chinese companies will use increased
access to flood the US market, resulting in higher trade surpluses. For China, meeting
the requirements for joining the WTO might cause short-term dislocations, especially
unemployment, as the inefficient state-run enterprises are forced to compete without state
subsidies. It also, however, might provide China with a stable economic position well
into the next century. Because both sides see value in China's ultimate admission to
the WTO, the countries have agreed publicly to hold definitive talks in 1997 on China's
accession to the WTO. 324 Many commentators believe that 1997 is the critical year for
these difficult issues to be resolved because of President Clinton's reelection. But up to
now, there are still no apparent signs that they would reach the deal quickly.
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WTO, INT'L Herald Trib., Nov. 26, 1996, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, Curnws File.
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B. The standards to determine a member's position in the WTO.
Under the auspices of the WTO, representatives from a wide range of economic
developments levels should meet to seek a consensus on a criterion to measure a nation's
economic development level. There can only be a solution if the process of coming up
with this criterion involves members from all levels of economic development. Ernst
August Hoerig, Chairman of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), argues that "[objective and rational criteria for such treatment would be the
best way to avoid such unwanted and often discriminatory results." There is at least the
awareness among most countries "of the need to convene and establish a common set of
rules of behavior," and the WTO framework could be used to expand this awareness
into some consensus of a fair criterion.
Economic development literature suggests three factors that could be used to
determine a country's level of development: 1) sustained increases in a country's GNP;
2) rate of growth a country's per capita GNP; 3) an increase in the importance of
manufacturing and service industries, coupled with a decrease in the percent of the
population working in agriculture.
Although significant, these three factors alone do not predict a country's ability to
compete in international trade. Merely looking at the percent of the population engaged in
international relations professor at George Washing University, argues that "[t]here is a real window of
opportunity to establish good relations between China and the United States, because the anti-China lobby
in the US has been effectively sidelined."
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See UNCTAD Countries Reaffirm GSP Benefits but US Warns GSP Is Not Aid Program, 9 INT'L
TRADE Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 938 (May 27, 1992).
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manufacturing and service does not indicate whether a nation will be able to compete
successfully. It seems logical that a world trading organization would also examine
factors that would show a country's promise in international trade when determining a
measurement for that country's economic development level.
The academic literature has also suggested other factors to define levels of
development. ' Those factors include income distribution, unemployment level, and
existence of social safety nets to help the poor. Although these factors may be
important in assessing the overall success of a nation, they seem irrelevant to a nation's
ability to compete internationally in exports.
Outside the academic world, various criteria have been used to measure levels of
development. The United States government uses a country's per capita income as the
critical factor in determining whether that country should be considered developing or
developed. However, per capita income alone may not indicate the sophistication of
the overall economy; it does not adequately measure international competitiveness in
specific products. An alternative approach is employed by the Dutch Ministry of
Development Cooperation. It looks at three factors to determine whether a country is
developing: 1) GNP per capita; 2) percentage share of manufacturing in GNP; and 3)
export performance by product group of each developing country relative to all
developing country exports. 333 The additional criteria used by the Dutch are more
accurate, but still incomplete because the criteria ignore overall GNP and thus fail to
illustrate the overall magnitude of a nation's economy. A former Mexican government
329
See id.
330
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331 See UNCTAD Head Issues Plea to Tie New GATTMTN to Broader Review ofThird World Concerns, 2
INT'L TRADE Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 932 (July 17, 1985).
90
official has suggested that, at a minimum, a country should be considered to have
advanced beyond developing country status when it has industrialized to the point where
it can offer competitive manufactured goods for export, and has a per capita income of
more than $1,000 per year.334 Although useful, this criteria is also incomplete because it
ignores the raw size of a nation's economy, and fails to look at that nation's actual
success in international trade.
The above discussion indicates that factors that are important in assessing a
nation's economic development level in the context of international trade. The article
proposes the following criteria to be used as a basis for determining how to measure
development: 1) GNP; 2) per capita GNP; 3) percent of economy involved in
manufacturing and service industries; and 4) export success, as measured by value of
prior years' exports, variety of exports, and existence of a trade deficit or surplus. These
four factors measure a nation's ability to successfully compete in international trade.
GNP is an important measure because it offers a benchmark to analyze the
economy as a whole. Per capita GNP, or income, is important because it gives more
context to the overall GNP, as it reflects the population of an economy. Both measures
are important because if only GNP were used, a very large country, such as China, would
appear to be more developed than a much small country, such as Sweden, merely because
China has a higher GNP. However, when per capita GNP is factored in, the analysis
changes dramatically because that measurement reflects the fact that Sweden has far
332
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fewer people, and equalizes the measurement. This does not mean that GNP is a faulty
measure, because there is significance in the overall size of an economy, but it must be
tempered with the per capita GNP.
Percentage of population involved in industry and service is important because it
looks to whether the country has moved away from an agricultural-based economy to a
more sophisticated economy. A country with a large industrial and service base might be
expected to compete well in the international economy. But. alone, this factor can also be
misleading because it may treat a country that is highly dependent on one product as
being sophisticated in all aspects of trade, which might not be the case. Thus, a country
that only exports one raw material might have a high percentage of the population
involved in service or industry, but still not have a sophisticated economy such that it can
compete successfully in all aspects of international trade. Thus, it is also important to
look at value of exports, variety of exports, and the existence of a trade deficit or surplus.
Those factors provide more evidence of the overall sophistication of a country's
economy.
The WTO should use its criteria to measure the ability of a nation to successfully
compete in international trade without the need for significant protection, as is commonly
given to developing countries. These four criteria offer a mechanism by which the WTO
could evaluate a country's development level, with an eye toward that country's ability to
engage in international trade without the need for much help. Thus, a nation that had low
ranks on the four criteria would not be as successful in international trade, so would be in
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need of more protection for its local industries, than a more advance country that had
greater success in international trade. Such an advanced country would not need as much
protection for its local industries.
C. Introducing the criteria to analyze China.
China shares characteristics of both developed and developing countries. An
analysis of the Chinese economy in light of the four factors outlined above, however,
suggests that China is neither a developed nor a developing country, but should be placed
in the new emerging economy category. First, China's GNP is $2 trillion. Based on
overall GNP, it recently surpassed Germany to become the third-largest economy in the
world.336 Furthermore, its GNP has been growing at a rate of approximately 10% per year
since the early 1980s, giving it one of the highest growth rates in the world. #While
growth is not explicitly a factor, it is relevant to the size of GNP and provides a very
strong indication of the overall strength of China's economy and suggests that China is
like many developed countries.
Second, China's per capita GNP is about $1600. 338 This is higher than many
developing countries, including Bangladesh and Algeria, but not as high as some of the
most advanced developing countries, including Chile and Mexico.339 This factor suggests
35
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that China is also like many developing countries. Third, although China has a fairly
large industrial capacity, it still has a very significant percentage of the population
leading an absolute subsistence existence as farmers.
340
Again, by itself, this factor
suggests that China might fit within the developing country category. The fourth factor,
success in international trade, indicates that China is more like a developed country, as it
has been quite successful. It has a trade surplus of $5 billion with the rest of the world.341
China is also the tenth largest exporter in the world.342
Thus, China shows great strength in overall GNP and international success, but less
strength in per capita GNP and economic maturity. Because of these mixed results China
should not be a developed country. However, the size of China's economy cannot be
ignored; this necessitates the creation of a new middle category. This category would
recognize the overall size of China's economy, yet also recognize that the economic
growth has not yet pervaded all of society yet. The Asian Tigers present the reverse
situation. They have lower overall GNP levels than developed countries, although higher
than most all developing countries, but their GNP per capita is much higher than other
developing counties. For example, South Korea has a $356 billion GNP and $7896 per
capita GNP.
This simple exercise of applying the four factors to China underscores the
problems the other proposed criteria had. It demonstrates how the choice of factors can
skew the picture. For instance, under the United States' criteria of looking only at per
($17,670); and the United States ($25,810). See id. It is also lower than that in some developing countries:
Argentina ($8205), Chile ($3609); and Mexico ($3490). See id.
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capita GNP, China appears to be a classic example of a developing country because of its
relatively low per capita GNP. By applying the criteria from the academic literature, the
per capita GNP and percentage of population in manufacturing criteria also would
strongly suggest that China was a developing country, with only its GNP to
counterbalance that conclusion. The four-factor analysis utilized by this article offers a
more complete picture of a nation's economy.
D, At the time being, the WTO should not demand the same high standard to
China as to developed countries, there should be a Middle Category for Emerging
Economies.
It was once easy to divide the countries of the world into two camps: North and
South—Developed and Developing. 343 Any such attempt to do that today would result in
a "vast over-simplification" because using economic criteria, the old "South" is now
made up of various "distinct economic categories."344 Ethiopia and Singapore illustrate
the stark changes that have occurred in the "South."345
For 1 994, the growth rate in the developing world was twice that of the developed
world.
346
This can be explained by the high growth rates in the transition economies in
Eastern and Central Europe, and the developing countries in Asia and Latin America.347
This increase in GNP in the developing world was also followed by a significant increase
in world merchandise trade. Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand had a combined $420 billion worth of exports in 1994. 348 Latin America added
343
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$185 billion in exports, and Central and Eastern Europe combined for $120 billion in
exports. Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Malaysia, Russia,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are all among the top 30 exporters in the world.349
This indicates that we can no longer speak of one monolithic developing world.
The WTO, in some cases, has already divided the "South" into two categories"
developing countries and "lower-income developing countries." Under this
classification, the 48 poorest countries, as defined by the United Nations, are lower-
income developing countries, but only 29 are the WTO members. 51 This bottom
category makes sense for the limited number of countries it covers, but it still leaves
every other non-developed country within the broad "developing country" category.
Because developing country is an overly broad category, it remains necessary to create an
intermediate category between developing country and developed country.
The idea of an intermediate category has been discussed for many years. In 1982,
there was some sentiment favoring creation of a middle category for the NICs (Newly
Industrialized Countries); they would "pay tariffs somewhere between the GSP level and
the rate paid by industrialized countries." Thus the "rapidly developing third world
states... have become mature competitors in certain sectors and no longer deserve some
of the trade concessions granted them when their industries were in their infancy."354 At
that time, the Director-General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, suggested the institution of a
new middle category for those countries that had achieved a higher level of development.
349
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350
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Countries in the middle would accept more responsibilities of being GATT members, but
would also gain more privileges. These privileges might include promises that the
NICs will not be pressured to pay higher wages as a result of their success in labor-
intensive production or to submit to "voluntary" export limits to developed countries.
The creation of a middle category seems to be a reasonable compromise for all
sides. It would ease many of the concerns held by the United States that advance
developing countries not be treated the same as those that are less advance. This could be
accomplished by setting higher requirements for trade liberalization for the emerging
economies than for other developing countries, but still keeping the requirements lower
than those borne by true developed countries such as the United States. This new
category also would ease the frustration felt by emerging economies at being told that
they must immediately take on all of the requirements of a developed country.
See GATT Director General Decries Protectionism, Says New MTN Round May Not Be the Solution, 20
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 942, (May 2, 1984).
356
See id.
VII. Conclusion
So, creating a new middle category within the WTO recognizes the reality that
developing countries are not a monolithic block. There are huge variations within the
developing world, and those differences must be taken into account when the
international community assigns economic responsibilities. Unless the world community
recognizes those differences, some countries will be getting bonuses that they do not
deserve at the expense of countries who truly need the help. In addition to these issues of
fairness, public support for free trade developed countries is eroded when the public sees
powerful economies taking advantage of preferences they no longer need. Thus, to
preserve an international system of free trade, it is important to ensure that every nation
participates to the extent that it is able, which means that countries like South Korea, and
ultimately China, will have to do more than their third world counterparts who are not yet
as advanced.
The stakes are very high. If the world community does not resolve the issue, China
will either be kept out of the WTO, or will use the developing country preferences to reap
an unfair advantage over its competitors. In the final analysis, China must be pressured to
further liberalize its economy, but that goal can best be served by including China at the
table as a member of the WTO.
In fact, no one now contends that China should be kept outside of the WTO for too
long, particularly in light of China's drastic tariff reductions implemented in April 1996.
The only question that remains is timing. Moreover, no matter at what time China's
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accession to the WTO eventually materializes, the fundamental changes brought about by
the application process have had, and will continue to have, lasting impact not only on
China's foreign trade system but on the world economic order as well.
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